Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 17.
There are, then,
judgments which state that certain kinds of things have good effects; and such
judgments, for the reasons just given, have the important characteristics (1)
that they are unlikely to be true, if they state that the kind of thing in
question always has good effects, and (2) that, even if they only state
that it generally has good effects, many of them will only be true of
certain periods in the world’s history. On the other hand there are judgments
which state that certain kinds of things are themselves good; and these differ
from the last in that, if true at all, they are all of them universally true. It
is, therefore, extremely important to distinguish these two kinds of possible
judgments. Both may be expressed in the same language: in both cases we commonly
say Such and such a thing is good.
But in the one case good
will
mean good as means,
i.e. merely that the thing is a means to
good—will have good effects: in the other case it will mean good as
end
—we shall be judging that the thing itself has the property which,
in the first case, we asserted only to belong to its effects. It is plain that
these are very different assertions to make about a thing; it is plain that
either or both of them may be made, both truly and falsely, about all manner of
things; and it is certain that unless we are clear as to which of the two we
mean to assert, we shall have a very poor chance of deciding rightly whether our
assertion is true or false. It is precisely this clearness as to the meaning of
the question asked which has hitherto been almost entirely lacking in ethical
speculation. Ethics has always been predominantly concerned with the
investigation of a limited class of actions. With regard to these we may ask
both how far they are good in themselves and how far they have
a general tendency to produce good results. And the arguments brought forward in
ethical discussion have always been of both classes—both such as would prove
the conduct in question to be good in itself and such as would prove it to be
good as a means. But that these are the only questions which any ethical
discussion can have to settle, and that to settle the one is not the
same thing as to settle the other—these two fundamental facts have in general
escaped the notice of ethical philosophers. Ethical questions are commonly asked
in an ambiguous form. It is asked What is a man’s duty under these
circumstances?
or Is it right to act this way?
or What ought we to
aim at securing?
But all these questions are capable of further analysis; a
correct answer to any of them involves both judgments of what is good in itself
and causal judgments. This is implied even by those who maintain that we have a
direct and immediate judgment of absolute rights and duties. Such a judgment can
only mean that the course of action in question is the best thing to
do; that, by acting so, every good that can be secured will have been
secured. Now we are not concerned with the question whether such a judgment will
ever be true. The question is: What does it imply, if it is true? And the only
possible answer is that, whether true or false, it implies both a proposition as
to the degree of goodness of the action in question, as compared with other
things, and a number of causal propositions. For it cannot be denied that the
action will have consequences: and to deny that the consequences matter is to
make a judgment of their intrinsic value, as compared with the action itself. In
asserting that the action is the best thing to do, we assert that it
together with its consequences presents a greater sum of intrinsic value than
any possible alternative. And this condition may be realised by any of the three
cases:—(a) If the action itself has greater intrinsic value than any
alternative, whereas both its consequences and those of the alternatives are
absolutely devoid either of intrinsic merit or intrinsic demerit; or
(b) if, though its consequences are intrinsically bad, the balance of
intrinsic value is greater than would be produced by any alternative; or
(c) if, its consequences being intrinsically good, the degree of value
belonging to them and it conjointly is greater than that of any alternative
series. In short, to assert that a certain line of conduct is, at a given time,
absolutely right or obligatory, is obviously to assert that more good or less
evil will exist in the world, if it be adopted than if anything else be done
instead. But this implies a judgment as to the value both of its own
consequences and of those of any possible alternative. And that an action will
have such and such consequences involves a number of causal judgments. (§ 17 ¶ 1)
Similarly, in answering the question What ought we to aim at
securing?
causal judgments are again involved, but in a somewhat different
way. We are liable to forget, because it is so obvious, that this question can
never be answered correctly except by naming something which can be
secured. Not everything can be secured; and, even if we judge that nothing which
cannot be obtained would be of equal value with that which can, the possibility
of the latter, as well as its value, is essential to its being a proper end of
action. Accordingly neither our judgments as to what actions we ought to
perform, nor even our judgments as to the ends which they ought to produce, are
pure judgments of intrinsic value. With regard to the former, an action which is
absolutely obligatory may have no intrinsic value whatsoever; that it
is perfectly virtuous may mean merely that it causes the best possible effects.
And with regard to the latter, these best possible results which justify our
action can, in any case, have only so much of intrinsic value as the laws of
nature allow us to secure; and they in their turn may have no intrinsic
value whatsoever, but may merely be a means to the attainment (in a still
further future) of something that has such value. Whenever, therefore, we ask
What ought we to do?
or What ought we to try to get?
we are asking
questions which involve a correct answer to two others, completely different in
kind from one another. We must know both what degree of intrinsic value
different things have, and how these different things may be obtained.
But the vast majority of questions which have actually been discussed in
Ethics—all practical questions, indeed—involve this double knowledge;
and they have been discussed without any clear separation of the two distinct
questions involved. A great part of the vast disagreements prevalent in Ethics
is to be attributed to this failure in analysis. By the use of conceptions which
involve both that of intrinsic value and that of causal relation, as if they
involved intrinsic value only, two different errors have been rendered almost
universal. Either it is assumed that nothing has intrinsic value which is not
possible, or else it is assumed that what is necessary must have intrinsic
value. Hence the primary and peculiar business of Ethics, the determination of
what things have intrinsic value and in what degrees, has received no adequate
treatment at all. And on the other hand a thorough discussion of means
has been also largely neglected, owing to an obscure perception of the truth
that it is perfectly irrelevant to the question of intrinsic values. But however
this may be, and however strongly any particular reader may be convinced that
some one of the mutually contradictory systems which hold the field has a given
correct answer either to the question what has intrinsic value, or to the
question what we ought to do, or to both, it must at least be admitted that the
questions what is best in itself and what will bring about the best possible,
are utterly distinct; that both belong to the actual subject-matter of Ethics;
and that the more clearly distinct questions are distinguished, the better is
our chance of answering both correctly. (§ 17 ¶ 2)