Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 1.
It is very easy
to point out some among our every-day judgments, with the truth of which Ethics
is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, So and so is a good man,
or
That fellow is a villain
; whenever we ask What ought I to do?
or
Is it wrong for me to do like this?
; whenever we hazard such remarks as
Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice
—it is undoubtedly the
business of Ethics to discuss such questions and such statements; to argue what
is the true answer when we ask what it is right to do, and to give reasons for
thinking that our statements about the character of persons or the morality of
actions are true or false. In the vast majority of cases, where we make
statements involving any of the terms virtue,
vice,
duty,
right,
ought,
good,
bad,
we are making ethical
judgments; and if we wish to discuss their truth, we shall be discussing a point
of Ethics. (§ 1 ¶ 1)
So much as this is not disputed; but it falls very far short of defining the province of Ethics. That province may indeed be defined as the whole truth about that which is at the same time common to all such judgments and peculiar to them. But we have still to ask the question: What is it that is thus common and peculiar? And this is a question to which very different answers have been given by ethical philosophers of acknowledged reputation, and none of them, perhaps, completely satisfactory. (§ 1 ¶ 2)
§ 2.
If we take
such examples as those given above, we shall not be far wrong in saying that
they are all of them concerned with the question of conduct
—with the
question, what, in the conduct of us, human beings, is good, and what is bad,
what is right, and what is wrong. For when we say that a man is good, we
commonly mean that he acts rightly; when we say that drunkenness is a vice, we
commonly mean that to get drunk is a wrong or wicked action. And this discussion
of human conduct is, in fact, that with which the name Ethics
is most
intimately associated. It is so associated by derivation; and conduct is
undoubtedly by far the commonest and most generally interesting object of
ethical judgments. (§ 2 ¶ 1)
Accordingly, we find that many ethical philosophers are disposed to
accept as an adequate definition of Ethics
the statement that it deals
with the question what is good or bad in human conduct. They hold that its
enquiries are properly confined to conduct
or to practice
; they
hold that the name practical philosophy
covers all the matter with which
it has to do. Now, without discussing the proper meaning of the word (for verbal
questions are properly left to the writers of dictionaries and other persons
interested in literature; philosophy, as we shall see, has no concern with
them), I may say that I intend to use Ethics
to cover more than this—a
usage, for which there is, I think, quite sufficient authority. I am using it to
cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: the general
enquiry into what is good. (§ 2 ¶ 2)
Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct
is; but, being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the
beginning, unless it is prepared to tell us what is good as well as what is
conduct. For good conduct
is a complex notion: all conduct is not good;
for some is certainly bad and some may be indifferent. And on the other hand,
other things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then, good
denotes some property, that is common to them and conduct; and if we examine
good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger of mistaking
for this property, some property which is not shared by those other things: and
thus we shall have made a mistake about Ethics even in this limited sense; for
we shall not know what good conduct really is. This is a mistake which many
writers have actually made, from limiting their enquiry to conduct. And hence I
shall try to avoid it by considering first what is good in general; hoping, that
if we can arrive at any certainty about this, it will be much easier to settle
the question of good conduct; for we all know pretty well what conduct
is. This, then, is our first question: What is good? and What is bad? and to the
discussion of this question (or these questions) I give the name Ethics, since
that science must, at all events, include it. (§ 2 ¶ 3)
§ 3.
But this is a question which
may have many meanings. If, for example, each of us were to say I am doing
good now
or I had a good dinner yesterday
these statements would
each of them be some sort of answer to our question, although perhaps a false
one. So, too, when A asks B what school he ought to send his son to, B’s answer
will certainly be an ethical judgment. And similarly all distribution of praise
or blame to any personage or thing that has existed, now exists, or will exist,
does give some answer to the question What is good?
In all such cases
some particular thing is judged to be good or bad: the question What?
is
answered by This.
But this is not the sense in which a scientific Ethics
asks the question. Not one, of all the many million answers of this kind, which
must be true, can form a part of an ethical system; although that science must
contain reasons and principles sufficient for deciding on the truth of all of
them. there are far too many persons, things and events in the world, past,
present, or to come, for a discussion of their individual merits to be embraced
in any science. Ethics, therefore, does not deal at all with facts of this
nature, facts that are unique, individual, absolutely particular; facts with
which such studies as history, geography, astronomy are compelled, in part at
least, to deal. And, for this reason, it is not the business of the ethical
philosopher to give personal advice or exhortation. (§ 3 ¶ 1)
§ 4.
But there is another meaning which may be given to the question
What is good?
Books are good
would be an answer to it, though an
answer obviously false; for some books are very bad indeed. And ethical
judgments of this kind do indeed belong to Ethics; though I shall not deal with
many of them. Such is the judgment Pleasure is good
—a judgment, of
which Ethics should discuss the truth, although it is not nearly as important as
that other judgment, with which we shall be much occupied
presently—Pleasure alone is good.
It is judgments of this
sort, which are made in such books on Ethics as contain a list of
virtues
—in Aristotle’s Ethics
for example. But it is
judgments of precisely the same kind, which form the substance of what is
commonly supposed to be a study different from Ethics, and one much less
respectable—the study of Casuistry. We may be told that Casuistry differs
from Ethics in that it is much more detailed and particular, Ethics much more
general. But it is most important to notice that Casuistry does not deal with
anything that is absolutely particular—particular in the only sense in
which it a perfectly precise line can be drawn between it and what is general.
It is not particular in the sense just noticed, the sense in which this book is
a particular book, and A’s friend’s advice particular advice.
Casuistry may indeed be more particular and Ethics more
general; but that means they differ only in degree and not in kind. And this is
universally true of particular
and general,
when used in this
common, but inaccurate, sense. So far as Ethics allows itself to give lists of
virtues or even to name constituents of the Ideal, it is indistinguishable from
Casuistry. Both alike deal with what is general, in the sense in which physics
and chemistry deal with what is general. Just as chemistry aims at discovering
what are the properties of oxygen, wherever it occurs, and not only of
this or that particular specimen of oxygen; so Casuistry aims at discovering
what actions are good, whenever they occur. In this respect Ethics and
Casuistry alike are to be classed with such sciences as physics, chemistry, and
physiology, in their absolute distinction from those of which history and
geography are instances. And it is to be noted that, owing to their detailed
nature, casuistical investigations are actually nearer to physics and to
chemistry than are the investigations usually assigned to Ethics. For just as
physics cannot rest content with the discovery that light is propagated by waves
of ether, but must go on to discover the particular nature of the ether-waves
corresponding to each several colour; so Casuistry, not content with the general
law that charity is a virtue must attempt to discover the relative merits of
every different form of charity. Casuistry forms, therefore, part of the ideal
of ethical science: Ethics cannot be complete without it. The defects of
Casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and
object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be
treated adequately in our present state of knowledge. The casuist has been
unable to distinguish, in the cases which he treats, those elements upon which
their value depends. Hence he often thinks two cases to be alike in respect of
value, when in reality they are alike only in some other respect. It is to
mistakes of this kind that the pernicious influence of such investigations has
been due. For Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. It cannot be
safely attempted at the beginning of our studies, but only at the end. (§ 4 ¶ 1)