Chapter 2. What Utilitarianism Is. (Notes)
Note 2 to Chapter 2 ¶ 19
An opponent, whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a
pleasure to acknowledge (the Rev. J. Llewelyn Davis), has objected to this
passage, saying: Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from
drowning does depend very much upon the motive with which it is done. Suppose
that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him saved him
from drowning simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite
tortures, would it tend to clearness to speak of that rescue as
(Ch. 2, n. 2 ¶1)a morally
right action
? Or suppose again, according to one of the stock illustrations
of ethical inquiries, that a man betrayed a trust received from a friend,
because the discharge of it would fatally injure that friend himself or some one
belonging to him, would utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal a
crime
as much as if it had been done with the meanest motive?
I submit, that he who saves another from drowning in order to
kill him by torture afterwards, does not differ only in motive from him who does
the same thing from duty or benevolence; the act itself is different. The rescue
of a man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first step of an act far
more atrocious than leaving him to drown would have been. Had Mr Davies said,
the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend very
much
— not upon the motive, but — upon the
intention
, no utilitarian would have differed from him. Mr Davies,
by an oversight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case confounded
the very different ideas of Motive and Intention. There is no point which
utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken more pains to
illustrate than this. The morality of an action depends entirely on the
intention — that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the
motive — that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do — when
it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality; though it makes a
great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it
indicates a good or bad habitual disposition — a bent of
character from which useful, or from which hurtful, actions are likely to arise.
(Ch. 2, n. 2 ¶ 2)