Temple, London, Xmas Day, 1890.

Dear Sir, — Having just got outside the roast turkey and plum-pudding which a proper recognition of our Lord’s nativity enjoins upon all believers, I find myself in a truly Christian frame of mind,—ready to quarrel with my best friends. I will commence with Liberty. Perhaps I should be justified in any case; for therein I find myself and co-thinkers described in this not very complimentary language: The position of those who favor a perpetual monopoly of ideas is so excessively silly that against it no force is required. I am in that position. But perhaps you use the word silly in its original sense of secure, trusting (whence simple-minded)? If so, I accept the situation.

First of all, I must admit that the table you furnish of copyright terms in different countries in the world does seem to justify the statement that the length of the term of copyright in a nation is inversely proportional to the height of its civilization. Similarly, I think a table might be framed showing that (England excepted) the scale of protective tariffs in a nation is directly proportional to the height of its civilization. America, Germany, and France are far ahead of poor Turkey, while some of the African states are absolute free-traders. Hence,—Long live Protection!

I cannot see the use of arguing whether literary property is a property or not; because it is or it is not, according as we make it so or not. We might as well argue whether beer is an exciseable liquor or not. The question is: Ought we to make it property? In other words: Should we (the public) be gainers or losers by granting proprietary right in ideas,—perpetual monopoly of ideas? I am in the silly position of thinking we should gain.

Perhaps at some future time, if you think it worth while, I might ask you to let me explain how perpetual copyright and perpetual patent-right would work out. At present I will content myself with referring to a letter signed Wm. Trinkaus, which appears in your issue of December 13, and which strikes me as one of the most profound and suggestive letters I have seen for a long time. It is appropriately entitled Dynamic Solutions of Natural Monopoly. Some of your readers would like to know whether the hiatus that occurs near the end of the first paragraph is due to want of space or to the excision of matter repugnant to the main principle contended for.

At any given moment it looks dangerous to grant an author a perpetual monopoly in his work, it is true. But let us take a long period. How many books written in the first decade of this century would now be worth a tinker’s straw in a publisher’s hands? A hundred? And how many fortunes were made during that same period which are still operating like the widow’s cruse of oil? Thousands. Who would pay James Watt’s successor a royalty on his steam-engine now? Layer upon layer of new thought, fresh ideas, have been laid upon it, till its share of royalties would surely amount to less than a penny a year. (Pardon my use of the word royalties: I don't know the American for it.) Mill’s works are still a valuable property, but the far grander works of Hobbes would not pay for the warehousing. The last edition of them (and a fine one, too) was sold for the price of waste-paper.

Yours truly,

Wordsworth Donisthorpe

Mr. Donisthorpe said not long ago in the Personal Rights Journal that he agreed with me in believing in the largest amount of liberty compatible with equality of liberty. Then he believes in equality of liberty. TheThen he believes that we should be gainers by equality of liberty. Then, if patents and copyrights can be shown to be inconsistent with equality of liberty, he will have to believe that we are losers by patents and copyrights. The direct question therefore is, not whether we are gainers or losers by patents and copyrights, but whether patents and copyrights are sanctioned by the law of equal liberty. My arguments on this point have been directed to showing that they are not, and, if Mr. Donisthorpe wishes to meet me, he must do so on this issue. The number of books that retain a permanent market value has nothing to do with the case. I maintain that it is unfair to make people pay a monopoly price even for the few that do. Nor is the question affected by the number and size and permanence of fortunes built up through privileges other than patent and copyright privileges. One monopoly seldom justifies another. I am not arguing that copyright is of all privileges the most evil in its influence, or that there are not other privileges which are much worse in their effects. I am simply arguing that it is a privilege, and ought to be abolished.

Mr. Donisthorpe seems, at first sight, to make a strong point in his comments upon my copyright table. But other questions soon suggest themselves. May not the absence of protective tariffs in some semi-barbarous countries be due to the fact that they have no industries to protect and no hope of any? Nevertheless, the same countries, though having no literature to protect, protect it more stringently than countries having literatures, presumably because they think they are doing a fine thing in standing up for property. This, however, is no more than a suggestion. In fact, my copyright table was little more than that. I offered it as interesting and suggestive rather than convincing. Facts are the most misleading things in the world unless all the facts are known in all their relations.

I admire Mr. Trinkaus’s article as much as Mr. Donisthorpe does, but I do not see how his championship of the dynamical view strengthens the argument for copyright. Mr. Trinkaus, like myself, is opposed to copyright. Regarding the supposed hiatus in his article, I would say that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the article was printed in the form in which it reached this office, without omission or material alteration.

I certainly hope that Mr. Donisthorpe will favor Liberty with a more extended presentation of his views on patents and copyrights. In fact, he has a standing invitation to occupy all the space he wants in this paper in discussion of any subject that he may choose.

T.