Mr. Yarros is an easy writer. A proverb tells the consequence to readers. He began on copyright by designating the notion of a perpetual monopoly of ideas as too silly to require any force for its refutation. But in his second article he says that it is only the difficulties in the practical application of the general principle that necessitate the abridgment and limitation of the right of property in this particular sphere, and, as to the perpetual and unlimited right to property in ideas, there is no argument against such a monopoly which does not apply equally well to monopoly in things material produced by labor. In his third article, he claims by the general principle of equal liberty property in ideas as having the same sanction as property in material things, and says: In no case does the author or inventor who has the monopoly of the use or sale of his invention or discovery infringe the equal right of others. But the application of the principle is difficult, hence where absolute justice cannot be had a temporary protection is accorded. As to literary works he says: I see no reason for violating the general principle in this case. Now then, was it excessively silly (if all this be so) for anyone to entertain the notion of a perpetual monopoly of ideas, at least until the practical breakdown of the general principle was discovered? Is it too silly a notion to need refutation, though Mr. Yarros’s refutation does not directly affect the notion, but affects a line of conduct? Can every one be expected to know off-hand when a general principle must be violated?

I gather that Mr. Yarros believes in two kinds of copyright: perpetual as to the exact form, and temporary as to the ideas,—temporary protection against plagiarism. In saying ideas I am reminded of a question how far form of expression is idea and how far it is labor. I feel quite certain that it is both combined in varying proportions; but, to proceed, I will say of form, to eliminate all question of coincidence, here is a book with the author’s name on the title page.

Mr. Yarros professes to diverge from the Spencerian position,—to make a distinction between the right to property in inventions and the right to literary property. Was it not an unnecessary distinction to be paraded in front of Mr. Tucker in view of the fact that Mr. Tucker was not attacking merely perpetual copyright and patent right but the temporary right also,—and in view of the fact that Mr. Yarros believes in the right of protection in the one case for some time and in the other for all time? Tucker is after the Canaanites and the Amalekites, whereupon Yarros comes in and says: I perceive a distinction. These are not all Amalekites!

The alleged divergence of Mr. Yarros from Spencer appears to consist not in a distinction between copyright, in the broad sense in which Spencer uses the word, and patent right, but in a distinction which leaves a great deal of copyright still in the same category with patent right and separates one conceivable kind or degree of copyright from the rest so remaining with patent right. Though Spencer does not make that distinction, there is nothing to show that he would be unwilling to make it. Had Mr. Yarros repudiated property in ideas and held to property in the form, there would have been a difference between him and Spencer instead of there being simply a distinction in that he analyzes a point which Spencer leaves untouched, but which Spencer’s argument would lead Spencer to analyze to the same effect were he considering copyright more minutely and not with relation to first the general principle and secondly his expedient abandonment of the general principle on account of practical difficulty. But were Spencer making such distinction, he would not call this a distinction between patent right and copyright, but a distinction between (1) that copyright which protects against plagiarism and with this all patent rights, and (2) that copyright which might be given to an author for his work say with his name on the title page.

Says Mr. Yarros: I cannot follow Spencer in his attempt to abridge the right of authors to their literary works. Yet Mr. Yarros has avowed himself in favor of abridging something which goes by the name of copyright—the protection of a monopoly in ideas—which is what Spencer had in view, as witness the quotation from Spencer made by Mr. Yarros. Spencer speaks of new knowledge, being claimed as private property, of property in ideas, which it seems difficult to specify, and thereupon he couples the inventor and author together, patent and copyright. All this shows that the abridgment spoken of was conceived with reference to that element in copyright which protects property in ideas.

On the Spencerian argument itself, I will claim a hearing in another article, but I will now draw attention [6] to these facts, namely, that whereas Spencer introduces assertions with the phrases: It is tolerably self-evident, It is clear, It is further manifest, Mr. Yarros predicates that property in ideas is logically deduced by Spencer from the principle of equal liberty. Spencer’s language does not lead me to think that Spencer would make quite this claim. He finds himself prepossessed in favor of property in ideas, and, as far as shown by the quotations, he does not perceive any violation of liberty in reaping a harvest from the activity of others whom he may assume to have been aided by the ideas. He does not see the harm of the method by which the man who supplies the idea is aided to secure his alleged share in the results of its application. The most I make of Spencer’s position as viewed by Spencer is that he thinks property in ideas is not vetoed by the principle of equal liberty; and included in his notion of property in ideas is a projection of power which I shall not admit to be part of the science of industrial relations.

Tak Kak