It is impossible to blame those who clamor for the radical reform of the present system of trial by jury, even though the changes suggested by them may not be in the line of progress at all. Trial by jury, as we know it, is a farce and a mockery. Weeks are spent in selecting men to serve; the intelligent and fit members of the community are carefully barred out; and of the ignorant only those of whose unfitness there can be no reasonable doubt are, under the law, preferred by judges and lawyers. In New York a police officer has recently been tried on charges of extortion. The evidence, arguments, judge's charge, and everything else consumed but two days; the jury's deliberations, which ended in a disagreement, lasted about twenty-four hours; while the work of selecting this jury required over three weeks. The cause of this odd disparity was the assumed necessity of keeping out men who new anything about the Lexow police revelations and who had any positive opinions about the character of the force and the standing of its individual members. In view of the sensational character of the Lexow revelations, it is safe to say that the man who asserts that his mind is a perfect blank on the subject is either a fool or a liar, and hence it is from the ranks of the fools and liars that the jury had to be drawn. The defence in the case in question was entirely willing to have such a jury, since the chances of conviction with it are exceedingly slight; but the prosecutor, realizing the abstruse character of the legal elements of extortion, insisted on exercising special care and selecting an exceptionally intelligent jury. Observe, then, their dilemma: on the one hand, reading and reflecting men, almost without exception, have opinions about the New York police force which render them unfit for jury service. Considering that during the Lexow sessions, which were spread over a long period, the newspapers were full of reports and editorial moralizing concerning the venality and hopeless corruption of the entire police force, and that the town had no more absorbing topic of discussion, the failure to form an opinion just be deemed a sure mark of imbecility. As a matter of fact, all rational men did form opinions, and there has been nothing in subsequent events to lead them to change their opinions. All rational men believe that, in the case of the superior grades of officers at least, it is fair to hold every man guilty until proven innocent. This, of course, "won't do" for a trial according to legal evidence, and hence all rational men had to be excluded. On the other hand, the prosecution knew that ignoramuses could never be made to understand the technical definitions of the legal elements of extortion, or the significance of the distinctions that were certain to arise on the arguments. Under the circumstances the wonder is that three weeks was all that was needed for the selection of a jury able to define "probative force and burden of proof, but destitute of any opinions regarding the moral standing of the police.

In spite of the extraordinary efforts, the result was a mistrial. Loud demands are now made for jury reform, and, as usual, the propositions are that a majority should be empowered to render a verdict and that the "better classes of citizens" should be induced or compelled to serve. Both propositions are essentially reactionary. A trial by the "better citizens" would not be a trial by the country, and a majority verdict would not be a verdict by the country. Only one sensible suggestion has been made,—that the examination of jurors with respect to their opinions should be entirely done away with. It is an insult to assume that a disinterested man cannot, regardless of an "opinion" formed from general reports and hearsay, arrive at a verdict on the legal evidence presented in court. In a newspaper age all intelligent men form opinions on such information as becomes public property, but few are ready to send a man to prison on the strength of such opinions.

It is needless to say that no one has suggested the reform of making the jury judges of law as well as of fact. Indeed, in view of the widespread dissatisfaction with jury trial, the suggestion must seem paradoxical. But, in reality, such a reform would, even under present conditions, prove highly beneficial. It would simplify the proceedings and check legal juggling. It would diminish injustice and introduce common sense, which is all but banished from common-law jurisprudence. I regret to see that the Baltimore "Sun," which doesn't know a good thing when it has it, deplores the fact that in Maryland the jury are still judges of law as well as of fact. It is safe to say that, if this system works unsatisfactorily in Delaware, the fault lies elsewhere. Let the "Sun" inquire into the methods of selection and drawing of names.In all the States of the Union where original trial by jury exists, it will be found that the safeguards which are necessary to secure a truly representative jury have been neglected or deliberately rejected. It is obvious that, the greater the power of the jury is, the more important the preliminary steps become. It is unfortunate that most of those who discuss jury reform know nothing regarding the true philosophy of the institution, and it is to be feared that the outcome of the present agitation will be the abolition of unanimity in jury verdicts. Utah, in her newly-framed constitution, has already provided for a majority verdict.

V.Y.