In the latest issue of Egoism — which, by the way, continues to come along occasionally, much to my gratification — H
very properly takes me to task editorially for my wholesale endorsement, in No. 312 of Liberty, of the position of J. Greevz Fisher regarding the relation of parents to their children, and of outsiders to both. While H,
like myself, endorses Mr. Fisher’s assertion of the legal non-responsibility of parents for the support of their children, he criticises me for not specifically disapproving the following passage that occurred in Mr. Fisher’s article in Personal Rights:
If a person, male or female, alleging parentage, beats, enslaves, or defrauds a child, the Individualist has a perfect right to interfere. He can voluntarily associate himself with the child in a mutual defence organization, and may undoubtedly assume acquiescence by the child. No title to guardianship by a claimant parent ought to be admitted when the alleged guardianship is inimical to the minor.
So much of the argument by which H
sustains his opposition to Mr. Fisher’s view as implies that the cruel treatment on the part of the parent is bestowed upon an invasive child is hardly to the purpose, for invasion on the child’s part is not included in the hypothesis. Parents may, and sometimes do, treat utterly inoffensive children in a most shocking manner, and the problem may well be simplified by confining the attention to the case of maltreatment of the non-invasive child. Putting aside, then, this irrelevant portion of H’s
argument, I hasten to say that his main contention that parental control of children is too excellent, too useful, too obviously proper a thing to warrant the setting-up of a superior right of the community in the premises, even in the interest of those who suffer from parental abuse of parental liberty, appeals to me as entirely sound.
The material with which the sociologist deals may be divided into two classes,—owners and owned. Now under this classification the child presents a difficulty; for, while unquestionably belonging in the category of the owned, he differs from all other parts of that category in the fact that there is steadily developing within him the power of self-emancipation, which at a certain point enables him to become an owner instead of remaining a part of the owned. But I am unable to see that this singularity can alter his technical status pending the day of self-emancipation. Till that day he must remain in the category of the owned, and, as a matter of course, till that day he must have an owner. The only question is: Who shall own him,—the parent or the community? We may decide upon one or the other, according to our view of the requirements of a true social life. If we are State Socialists, we shall decide in favor of the community. If we are Anarchists, we shall decide in favor of the parent. But to whichever of these two we award the control of the child, there the control belongs; and thereafter to attempt to award a superior control to the other is to disregard the principle originally chosen for our guidance.
If parental ownership and control be acknowledged, it is absurd to say that the doctrine of equal liberty gives the community a right to deprive the parent of control and assume ownership of the child itself whenever parental control is exercised cruelly. This absurdity may best be reocgnized by turning the case about. Suppose the community were to be acknowledged as the rightful owner of all children; and suppose, further, that in the exercise of its control it were to treat a certain child with extreme cruelty (as often happens in State charitable
institutions). In such a case, would the doctrine of equal liberty give the mother of the abused child the right to take the child out of the hands of the State, which by the hypothesis is its rightful owner, and assume ownership of it herself? Clearly not. Yet displacement of the State by the mother in the latter case would be no more absurd than the displacement of the mother by the State in the former. The opinion which in either case would favor displacement arises from a feeling of sympathy which blinds the person holding it to the meaning of equal liberty. The question whether such sympathy is to be heeded is simply the old question as to when and where it is advisable to deliberately and avowedly violate the rule which in general we find invaluable in the shaping of our social conduct.
The practical solution of this difficulty will probably be found in the fact that ideas are not realized suddenly and completely, but in a tentative and incomplete fashion by people who do not grasp them fully, and who are therefore less reluctant than the consistent philosopher to deviate in deference to a concrete obstacle. Even such partial, but increasing, realization of the doctrine of equal liberty would gradually eliminate the causes that lead parents to behave abnormally, and thus the question would settle itself.
H,
then, is right in saying that I should have taken exception to the sentences above quoted from Mr. Fisher’s article, and I thank him for calling attention to my sin of omission. True, he imputes it to me as a sin of commission, and to this I object. It is not true, as H
thinks, that I intentionally committed
myself to Mr. Fisher’ incidental error; I simply neglected it in emphasizing my agreement with his main position. But even this imputation of intention
I am bound to take as a compliment, for it amounts to a declaration that carelessness cannot be assumed in the case of a person who is habitually careful in his statements.