The comment of Mr. Badcock in another column upon Egoism’s recent criticism of what it supposed to be my attitude regarding the relation of outsiders to parents who maltreat their children was written before he had seen my rejoinder; and I judge that he must have been surprised, not to say horrified, to find me joining the enemy, bag and baggage. With the reasons which I advanced in support of my position I hope he will deal later, since his present letter does not meet them.
I shall not undertake to say for Egoism whether it does or does not bow to equal liberty as a fetich, regardless of the sufferings of others that may result. But for myself I repeat what I have often said,—that I have no idols. Mr. Badcock has no occasion to discuss with me the propriety of the end at which he aims,—the disappearance of pain. That is my aim also. If I insist on the application of the equal liberty idea to every sphere of life, including the relations of parents to children, and of outsiders to both, it is because I believe that this will result on the whole in a minimum of pain. If Mr. Badcock denies it, it is incumbent upon him to show that State control, or a mixture of State and parental control, or some other method of provision for children which he may suggest, will reslut on the whole in less pain than the plan of exclusively parental control. I am ready to listen carefully to anything that he may have to say on this point. But, if he does not deny it, then I can scarcely think it worth while to make an outcry over what seems to Mr. Badcock the callousness of Egoism as long as that journal favors the very measures which Mr. Badcock and I look upon as calculated to most effectively lessen pain.
Mr. Badcock should remember that G.,
in the articles to which I objected some years ago, went counter to equal liberty in asserting the obligation of children to parents, whereas H.,
in denying the obligation of parents to children, is affirming equal liberty. There is a vital difference between the two. Both H.
and G.
may be cruel, or may be kind; but from a public standpoint the natures of either may well be let alone until they prompt them to favor measures that increase suffering.
As long as children are unable to make contracts, I know of no reason why they should not be put on a par with property,
especially if putting them on a par with property tends on the whole to lessen their suffering, and if there is no method of dealing with them that does not put them virtually on a par with property. It certainly is very unfortunate that this is an imperfect world, and that there is no system which will absolutely abolish pain; but will not Mr. Badcock and I have to put up with the best system we can devise, even though it does fall short of our sympathetic requirements? I know people who are so sympathetic that they will rush to save a stranger in danger of immediate destruction, even though by that very act they would indirectly send a dozen friends to their death. As Herman Kuehn said in these columns, when speaking of Rita in Ibsen’s Little Eyolf, such persons are really moved, not so much by a desire to make all other people happy, as to satisfy their own desire for an activity prompted by their sympathy. It does not follow that, if our liberty principles . . . . fall short of our requirements, . . . . they must be re-cast.
That depends upon whether it is possible to re-cast them so that they will be better suited to our purpose.