The Articles in the January Number are mainly theological. There are however four which deal directly with philosophical problems. There is an article by Mr Wenley on Illingworth's Personality, two by Professor Iverach, one on Wundt's Human and Animal Psychology and one on Hughes' The Theory of Inference, and an article by Alexander Martin on Seth's A Study of Ethical principles. Mr Wenley first gives an analysis of Illingworth's Bampton Lecture, and does full justice to its merit. He finds however that
the ontological aspect of the question, which after all is the fundamental one, has been too little emphasised, and at the present juncture, especially in a work likely to be widely read, this is to be regretted. The subsequent part of his article is an attempt to supply the lacking element. Mr Wenley's view, too briefly set forth, is that personality
furnishes the very ground of our judgment of reality, and so far from being limited, rather affords the sole standard whereby a being constituted like man, can in any degree measure infinity. The remarks of Mr Wenley lead us to hope that he will return to the subject and work out his view in an adequate manner. Professor Iverach deals with Wundt's Lectures and looks at the translation of them as a sign of the increased interest taken in psychological questions. Having given a description of Wundt's aim, methods, and results, he takes exception to Wundt's explanation of the connection between mental and physical processes, regards Wundt's attempt at a description of the genesis of the
Self, of its character and function, as unsatisfactory, and questions the use which is made of Weber's law, as modified and generalised by Fechner, and applied by Wundt. He quotes Bourne to show that Weber's law taken absolutely is meaningless, and he quotes James of Harvard to show that the law is physiological. The notice of Hughes' Theory of Inference characterises the book as important and suggestive. Mr Martin's notice of Seth's Ethical principles, shows us how well Mr Martin is equipped for ethical study, and how much might be done by him if he gave himself to it. He is both just and generous in his appreciation of Seth's work. The strongest part of the notice is where he lays his finger on a defect in Seth's treatment of the subject.
A deeper analysis of the Conception of Personality would appear to be called for here. The formula in question can only supply the place of an ethical principle, from which the particular obligations of the good life may be seen to spring, when it is interpreted of such a Self as is nothing, and can (¶ 1)
realise nothing except in an through the network of relations it sustains to other personalities like itself, and one would add, to that Supreme Personality which is at once the law, the strength, and the end of the moral life ofall of them.
Vol. I., No. 6.
J. Dewey. The Theory of Emotion. I. [An attempt to harmonise the Lange-James theory with Darwin's account of emotional
expression. All the bodily changes are either teleological adjustments or disturbances and alienations of such adjustments. They cannot be regarded, therefore, as the expression of a pre-existant emotion. Though obscurely expressed in many places, the article brings up several important points in a suggestive way.] C. L. Dana, The Study of a Case of Amnesia or
Double Consciousness [Clinical report. Case explained tentatively by inhibition of some special functions of the nerve cells implicated.] J. H. Hyslop. Experiments in Space Perception. II. [Tentative conclusion: (1) Apparent magnitude is not determined by retinal magnitude, but by a certain relation between this and the fixation-point or degree of convergence; (2) Localisation depends much more on fusion than upon muscular tension of the eyes, i.e., the functions of space perception are central.--Before the work can be evaluated, it must be brought into connection with the rest of the recent literature. The writer leaves this entirely to the reader.] E. A. Kirkpatrick. An Experimental Study of Memeory. [Rough work with school-children; pædagogically suggestive.] Discussion: J. M. Baldwin. The Origin of Emotional Expression. [In its origin, emotion is a central phenomenon of pleasure and pain, though at the present stage of development it is constituted mainly by the return-wave from the periphery of reactions that have become habitual. While wrong from the point of view of origin, the Lange-James theory, in its amended form, holds for the developed consciousness. An interesting and clearly reasoned paper, reaching a somewhat paradoxical conclusion.] Psychological Literature. Notes. (¶ 2)
Vol. II. No. 1.
C. Stumpf. Hermann von Helmholtz and the New Psychology. [Brief appreciation of Helmholtz' work in physiological psychology.] J. Dewey. The Theory of Emotion (II.) [In emotion the mode of behaviour is the primary thing, and constitutes the emotional seizure or Affect, and the object, at one at the same time. We do not have, e.g., the idea of the bear as something to be escaped, and so run away. We run instinctively, and so get the idea of bearassomethingtoberunfrom, frightfulbear, or (what comes to the same thing) howfrightenedIam. Though this position is maintained through the greater part of the article, a somewhat different statement is made at the end, as the conclusion of the whole.] M. A. Starr. The Muscular Sense and its Location in the Brain Cortex. [The centres are distinct from touch, pain, or temperature sense-centres, and from motor centres. They lie just behind the motor area in the parietal region.] G. W. Fitz. A Location Reaction Apparatus. Discussions: P. Shorey. Mind and Body. [A somewhat superficial examination of Wundt's recent article Ueber psychische Causalität, etc.] H. M. Stanley. Attention as intensifying Sensation. [Discussion of Münsterberg's recent study of the topic. Unimportant.] H. R. Marshall. Pleasure-pain and Emotion. [Answer to Santayana's view of the writers recent book on the subject.] E. B. Titchener. A Comment. [Note on James' treatment of Wundt's doctrine of the apperception-process and its attendant phenomena.] Psychological Literature. Notes. (¶ 3)
Vol. IV., No. 1.
S. W. Dyde. Evolution and Development. [Evolution is the key-note of biology; development is said by many to be the key-note of psychology. It may be well to ask in a few typical cases what the evolution-philosophy has done for us. (1) The concept of the social organism has widened.
Dissatisfaction with and revolt against the idea that the state is going comfortably forward ... are cardinal elements in the conception of the development of society. (2) Evolution asserts advance from higher to lower types. This has radically changed the conception of history. (Parenthesis on
conscious contact with previous thought in its relation to progress.) (3) The individual life epitomises the racial. This implies that mind should be ordered not into faculties, but into an ascending scale of apprehensions of reality; and that the simplest psychoses are not the nearest to reality.] S. E. Mezes. Pleasure and Pain defined. [A psychic fact attended to is pleasant or not according as there is or is not a discernible inhibition in the apperceptive system into which it is received. This is a very similar position to that of Dr J. Ward.--Pain is unpleasant sensation of abnormal intensity: if attention and felt inhibition are absent the state is indifferent: mixed feelings are possible.] S. H. Mellone. The Method of Idealist Ethics. [(1) Ethics as dealing with the ultimate ideal of life is part of Ontology. Its problem is twofold: how to define the End, and how to get the meaning of the statement that
this is the end. Definition, without exposition of the sense in which we can affirm the reality of the defined, is not enough. (2) The Ethics of Conduct is not a science, but a body of doctrines bearing on practice. It assumes the End, and looks to Sociology and Psychology for help in its realisation.] E. B. Titchener. Affective Memory. [Critique of Ribot's Recherches sur la mémoire affective. It is impossible to attend to pleasantness-unpleasantness as such, voluntarily to recall a past affective state as such, and to experience the spontaneous revival of it. Even if an affective state were reproducible, it would not be recognisable.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. (¶ 4)
Sept.–Dec. 1894. Vol. VIII. 2, 3, 4, 5.
The unity of educational reform. C. W. Eliot. [Enforces the promotion of individual instruction, careful training of organs of sense, practice in group and comparison of different sensations and contacts--with accurate written records thereof, memory-training, training in power of expression, in logical setting forth of a process of reasoning, and lastly, the holding fast of noble ideals.] Illiteracy in the United States. T. H. Blodgett. [The greatest relative progress is by the coloured population.] A study of the Mathematical Consciousness. Mary. W. Calkins. [Includes a few interesting tables comparing algebraists and geometricians, men and women.
The figures are evidently too few to lead to demonstrated conclusions.] The educational value of play... T. L. Hughes. [Character-power grows by self-activity.] Friedrich Paulsen. A. W. Shaw. [An outline of Paulsen's teaching. Good portrait.] Professional and general education. F. A. Walker. [
With a proper arrangement of subjects and with good teachers, it is entirely possible ... to give ... pupils ... studies and exercises which will make them resolute, exact and strong, and
at least a moderate measure of those
which will make them also broad and high and fine.] Bashfulness in Children. J. Mark Baldwin. [
Important hints at the history of societies, both human and animal, are afforded by the phenomena of bashfulness in children.] A Scheme of Sociological Study. G. E. Vincent. [Indicates propositions endorsed by general consensus of opinion, derives a sequence of studies pedagogically rational, and suggests readjustment of educational structure of to-day in accordance with the scheme proposed.] Disappointing results of Science-teaching. Discussion. A. E. Dolbear. [Those who have had the best available science-teaching do not shew the superiority claimed for it in insight, skill, tact, judgment, and affairs in general. (¶ 5)
19me année, Dec. 1894.
G. Ferrero. Les conditions du progrès moral. [M. Ferrero proposes to replace the biological theory of moral progress, which rests upon the disputable assumption of the heredity of moral tendencies, by what he describes as a psychological theory.
La morale must be divided into
la morale sexuelle and
la morale active. The first is here left aside as depending on laws of its own, and only the second, which covers all social relations and functions save reproductive, is dealt with. Moral progress implies in ultimate analysis the idea of a growing repugnance to the infliction of pain on our fellow-beings. This repugnance arises from sympathy, and sympathy (1) is in inverse ratio to interest, and (2) varies according to resemblance. Further, progress depends upon the law of comparison, the presence of a higher standard by which existing institutions may be judged. Hence the tendency to a moral equilibrium of nations. The moral contradictions often observable in a people are due to the multiplicity of the laws determining progress, since these laws do not always operate together. No simple theory is adequate to explain so complex a phenomenon as moral progress.] G. Le Bon. Les bases psychologiques du dressage: Étude de psychologie comparée. [The astonishing memory of a horse makes him singularly susceptible to training by association. It is association by contiguity that comes principally into play.] Dr Tardieu. Étude de psychologie professionelle: Le médecin. [Discusses the physical and mental qualifications for the progression of medicine.] (¶ 6)
20me anée, Jan. 1895.
J. Soury. La vision mentale (1er article, avec fig.). [A close and critical survey of recent progress in the knowledge of the visual organs and centres.] L. Dauriac. Psychologie due musicien. III. De l'intelligence musicale et de ses conditions subjectives. [Discusses in particular the relation between an
ear for music and an intelligent appreciation of it.] A. Schinz. Morale et déterminisme. [The moral problem par excellence is the reconciliation of determinism, required by science, with the sense of moral obligation, undeniably present in man. Moral obligation must be taken as a manifestation of determinism,--and as containing two elements, the formal which is invariable (obligation properly so called) and the material which is variable (the moral law). From the confusion of these two elements arise the errors of the theory of moral innateness. The content of the moral law varies according to place, time, and even individual,--the only unity exhibited in history is a general progress in a certain constant and uniform direction, and this cannot be taken as resulting from a direct innateness. Neither the innate moral law (Kant), nor the moral sense (Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, etc.) can be accepted as criterion of right and wrong, of moral progress; for neither leaves room for the actual variations in moral judgment. It is in the nature of the intellect (l'intelligence) itself that the criterion must be looked for,--of the intellect conceived, with Kant, as synthetic reason. Several motives of action being presented, the intellect is impelled by its proper laws of synthesis to judge one better than another. The moral feeling does not differ qualitatively from intellection, is a prolongation or effect of it. Thus the moral notions are only special manifestations of the general laws of the intellect--tec.] Revue Générale. Belot. Science et practique sociales d'après des publications récentes (1re partie). (¶ 7)
E. Durkheim. L'enseignement philosophique et l'agrégation de philosophie. [The teaching of philosophy in the Lycées, which formerly owed its force and inspiration to Cousin and has been succeeded by
un dilettantisme anarchique, must be replaced by a teaching of philosophy more in accordance with modern requirements. M. Durkheim recommends a solid training in psychology,--as also in methodology; and that the teaching without advocating any special system should be such as to instil the scientific spirit.] G. Tarde. Criminalité et santé sociale. [A reply to the papers of M. Durkheim in the Revue entitled Règles de la méthode sociologique; and in particular to his paradox that crime is an essential factor in the social well-being.] J. Soury La vision mentale (fin). Belot. Science et pratique sociales d'après des publications récentes (2me et dernière partie). Analyses, etc. (¶ 8)
The reviewer wishes to express regret for a careless error in the last number of Mind, where it was stated that M. Ribot in his paper Recherches sur la mémoire affective had obtained his consensus of opinion by the circulation of printed questions,--the real fact being that M. Ribot made his interrogations personally and directly. (¶ 9)
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.
Troisième Année, 1.
A. Sabatier. De l'Orientation de la Méthode en Évolutionisme. [M. Sabatier's main point is that evolution logically excludes new and relatively independent points of departure. Whatever has been evolved must be traced back to earlier and simpler rudiments, and finally to its own potential existence. When the writer uses the word
potential we have not the least idea what he means. He does not seem to be aware of the special difficulty attaching to a psychological application of his theory. Before the sensation of
red existed, what can its rudiments or its potentiality have been?] Louis Weber Remarques sur le Problème de l'Instinct. [Curiously enough, M. Weber urges a doctrine exactly opposite to that of M. Sabatier. He holds that psychical evolution depends on variations which are spontaneously initiated, so that, though we can assign their necessary conditions, we can never assign their sufficient conditions. The sifting and systematising of such variations he accounts for, on Darwinian lines, by natural selection. He treats of the present state of Animal Psychology, noting its extreme vagueness and generality, and making valuable suggestions for tis future development. The whole paper is interesting.] Criton. Troisième Dialogue Philosophique entre Eudoxe et Ariste. [In this third Dialogue between Eudoxe and Ariste the conclusion which is reached is that no one can know himself otherwise than as a body, and that introspection is impossible. The argumentation is clever, but most readers will regard Ariste as rather a feeble representative of the doctrine assailed.] Discussions, etc. (¶ 10)
Zeits. f. Psych. u. Phys. d. Sinnesborg.
Bd. VII., Heft 5 und 6.
L. W. Stern. Die Wahrnehmung von Bewegungen vermittelst des Auges. [If we follow a moving object with the eyes, we do not have a uniformly persistent and continuously changing muscular contraction, correlated with a single sensation; but a large number of short separate jerks, regulated by perpetual voluntary impulses. Constituents of the total mental process are: the perception of after-image traces of resting objects in the environment of the moved; that of an optical image of the moved object, practically constant, but perpetually subject to small displacements; that of multifarious sensations from the eye-muscles; and the consciousness of perpetual voluntary impulses regulating the movement of the eye.] F. Hitschmann. Ueber das Traumleben des Blinden. [In ordinary dreaming, a very small part is played by sense-ideas, with the exception of the auditory ideas of the human voice. So with peripherally excited dreams: only sound-stimuli are important. Organic sensations are dreamed as such, not interpreted. The dreams of the blind are composed of vicarious ideas (previously discussed by the author in the Zeits.), abstract ideas, ideas of form (
dreaming in verse) and strongly toned presentations. L. W. Stern. Die Wahrnehmung von Helligkeitsveränderungen: Nachtrag. Litteraturebericht. Obituary Note on H. von Helmholtz. Bibliographie der psychophysischen Litteratur des Jahres 1893. [1324 numbers: not quite exhaustive.] (¶ 11)
Bd. VIII., Heft. 1 und 2.
J. von Kries. Ueber die Natur gewisser mit den psychischen Vorgängen verknüpfter Gehirnzustände. [A tentative but important article upon cerebral predispositions. Conscious processes are influenced by neural processes, which have no direct conscious correlates. These neural processes can be grouped together as connective predispositions (reading-off of a line of music in the key symbolised at its beginning), and as predispositions sensu stricto (dispositive Einstellungen). Attention involves both. The writer discusses the validity-consciousness of the judgment, the abstract idea, rhythm, etc.: as well as the nature of the predisposition which he uses to explain them, its laws, and rival hypotheses (unconscious mental states, etc.). Particularly interesting is the comparison of his Einstellung with Exner's Hemmung and Bahnung.] C. du Bois-Reymond. Ueber die latente Hypermetropie. A. Hofler. Psychische Arbeit. I. [Psychical work, like mechanical, is force × distance. We must take account of both factors: e.g., the length of the column of figures added, and the force of the attention directed upon the addition.--There are two ways of determining the principal forms of psychical work, the historical and the systematic. The latter gives us Idea and Judgment, Feeling and Desire. At first sight, 2 and 4 are work, 1 and 3 not-work. But each must be examined for itself.] Litteraturbericht. (¶ 12)
Archiv für systematische Philosophie
--Bd. IU., Heft i.
E. Zeller Ueber Metaphysik als Erfahrungswissenschaft. [A defence of constructive philosophy, and a schematic program of it. Its starting-point must be empirical data.] B. Erdmann. Begriffsbestimmung der Beobachtung überhaupt. [Observation is
attentive apperceptive Perception. The distinctive characteristic of scientific observation is that in its case the apperceptive groups have a conceptual structure, so that they evolve themselves in consciousness as a series of judgments.] G. Simmel. Ueber eine Beziehung der Selectionslehre zur Erkenntnistheorie. [It has been urged against the Spencerian theory of the part played by natural selection as a condition of the evolution of our knowledge and a guarantee of its validity, that mere utility in the struggle for existence is no test of truth. Mr Simmel here cuts the Gordian knot by boldly affirming that in ultimate analysis all that the word
truth can mean for us is practical efficiency.] K. Lasswitz. Ueber psychophysische Energie und ihree Factoren. [By psychophysical energy is meant
that part of the energy of a structure, change in which corresponds to change in the state of consciousness of this structure. If de stands for a positive or negative increment of psychophysical energy, di for a change in its intensity-factor (potential), then de will be the physical correlate of the total change in the state of consciousness; di will be the physical correlate of the change in sensation; and the capcity-factor c of the psychophysical is connected with these quantities by the equation Lasswitz suggests that the capacity-factor is the physical correlate of feeling.] P. Natorp. Grundlinien einer Theorie der Willensbildung (I.). (¶ 13)
de=cdi+idc, which, when c is constant, is reducible to de=cdi.
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
Band 105. Heft 2.
Ludwig Busse. Zur Beurteilung des Utilitarismus. [Utilitarianism is in the right as against the purism of Kant when it accentuates the fact that whatever is good must be capable of being experienced and enjoyed. Its chief defect is its failure to distinguish ethical good as the unconditionally highest pleasure, from pleasure in general.] R. Falckenburg. Die Entwickelung der Lotzsechen Zeitlehre. [Lotze's change of front on the question of the ideality of time must have struck most careful readers of his works. Professor Falckenburg here enters into a careful historical examination of the development of Lotze's views on this point. His general result is that Lotze consistently taught that time and change exist only for our subjective apprehension, in all his writings prior to the Metaphysik of 1879. He there admits the reality of change, but denies that of the time-form as a pre-condition of change. But this modification of his doctrine relates only to process in finite things. It appears from the abstract of his lectures on Philosophy of Religion 1878–79, that he still continued to regard the Absolute as being in its intrinsic nature superior to time conditions. Professor Falckenburg points out that the published notes of the lectures on Metaphysics represent lectures given in 1865. Here Geijer and Höffding are wrong in referring to them as evidence of Lotze's later views.] J. Zahnfleisch. Zur Kritik der Aristotelischen Metaphysik. Recensionen, etc. (¶ 14)
Bd. VIII. Heft. 1.
Dr E. Rolfes. Die vorgebliche Präexistenz des Geistes bei Aristoteles. [In this paper, the writer maintains against Zeller that Aristotle does not admit the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. Plato does, as a consequence of his theory of cognition; but Aristotle has a quite different theory. He indeed admits that the inellectual soul, in contrast to the sensitive and vegetative life-principle,
comes from without; but these words do not necessarily imply pre-existence. He calls the mind
eternal; but the sense of the word may be only
eternal after death. He denies that the soul is generated or dissolved; but as he says ἀγέννητος, not ἀγένητος, this is evidently meant of the generation of form out of matter. (To be concluded.)] Prof. Dr C. Gutberlet. Ueber Messbarkeit psychischer Acte (concluded). [The bare possibility of measuring psychical acts being admitted, there comes the practical question: How are they to be measured? The method of equal differences, which gradually adds to the stimulus-unit, until an impression is produced equal to the sensation to be measured, taking into account Weber's law (sufficiently correct, notwithstanding great deviations from it in the case of certain senses), is the easiest to understand and expound; though there are others, more exact, and employing more correct formulæ. Fechner's and Elsas' methods seem not to be quite sound mathematically. All these measurements are clearly of no value either from a physiological or from a psychological point of view.] Jos. Nassen. Ueber den platonischen Gottesbegriff (concluded). [Plato decidedly admits one supreme God, but not the Trinity in anything like a Christian sense. His respect for the established religion leads him also to admit the existence of inferior deities, but they are merely spiritual existences, or
dæmons, with whom he identifies them in many passages. God Providence is a doctrine that he states quite clearly. As to the question whether, according to him, the Godhead and the Substantial Idea of Goodness were one and the same, both inferences from his doctrines and quotations from his works point to contradictory conclusions. Plato's doctrines were all his life, it must be remembered, in a state of change and evolution. He seems at times to have come very near identifying the active God of his system with his ideal World of Types, but never to have quite succeeded.] Dr Beda Adlhoch, O.S.B. Der Gottesbeweis des hl. Anselm. [St Anselm's proof of God's existence, much esteemed by many of old, is now generally considered to be an Ontologistic fallacy. It is not. It is a psychological and historical proof, and is conclusive. We take the fact that the notion of God is that of the most perfect being possible. But if this did not imply that God really and truly exists, it would no longer be that of the most perfect being possible. The writer expounds this view with many extracts from Anselm, and sums up with a classification of Atheists: Agnostics, practical and theoretical; Monists, Sceptics, and rebellious Atheists, or Atheists of the will. (To be continued.)] (¶ 15)
Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
XIX. Jahrgang, Heft i.
R. Avenarius. Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie. (Artikel III.) [These articles of Avenarius, in their endeavour to move with slow precision, seem scarcely to succeed in moving at all. Certainly in the present one there is no advance upon the previous position,--that the psychical is not a particular kind of experience, but experience in general considered from a certain point of view, viz. as dependent upon
definite changes in the system C.] A. Marty. Ueber subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältniss der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie. (Artikel VI.) [Maintains against Sigwart and Erdmann that existence is not a predicate in the existential judgment. A special point is made of the absurdity of regarding the concept of existence as a predicate, and at the same time denying that it enlarges the content of the subject of which it is predicated. There follows an interesting discussion of the nature of the inner speech-form, with the view of explaining the grammatical dress of impersonal and existential propositions. Marty rightly insists that the inner speech-form, like the word itself, is sign and not meaning. From confusion between meaning and inner form many errors have arisen; words have been treated as synonymous merely because they are connected with similar symbolic images; and, conversely, they have been supposed to differ in meaning merely because of a difference in inner speech-form. The author next considers the nature of the categorical or double judgment; under this head are included such judgments as
This is red;
This flower is blue. In all judgments which involve predicate of synthesis, the predication depends on and is inseparably blended with another judgment affirming the subject. As we obtain the concept of existence by reflexion on the impresonal and existential judgment, so we obtain that of identity by reflexion on the predicative judgment. The article concludes with an acute criticism of Erdmann's nominalism, and of the place he assigns to intuition in relation to judgment.] A. Spir. Von der Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen. Anzeigen etc. (¶ 16)