Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 6.
What, then, is good?
How is good to be defined? Now it may be thought that this is a verbal question.
A definition does indeed often mean the expressing of one word’s meaning in
other words. But this is not the sort of definition I am asking for. Such a
definition can never be of ultimate importance to any study except lexicography.
If I wanted that kind of definition I should have to consider in the first place
how people generally used the word good
; but my business is not with its
proper usage, as established by custom. I should, indeed, be foolish if I tried
to use it for something which it did not usually denote: if, for instance, I
were to announce that, whenever I used the word good,
I must be
understood to be thinking of that object which is usually denoted by the word
table.
I shall, therefore, use the word in the sense in which I think it
is ordinarily used; but at the same time I am not anxious to discuss whether I
am right in thinking it is so used. My business is solely with that object or
idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand
for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about
this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement. (§ 6 ¶ 1)
But if we understand the question in this sense, my answer to it may
seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked, What is good?
my answer is
that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked How is
good to be defined?
my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all
I have to say about it. But disappointing as these answers may appear, they are
of the very last importance. To readers who are familiar with philosophic
terminology, I can express their importance by saying that they amount to this:
That propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic;
and that is plainly no trivial matter. And the same thing may be expressed more
popularly, by saying that, if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an
axiom as that Pleasure is the only good
or that The good is the
desired
on the pretence that this is the very meaning of the word
. (§ 6 ¶ 2)