Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 14.
Good,
then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know,
there is only one ethical writer, Prof. Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognised
and stated this fact. We shall see, indeed, how far many of the most reputed
ethical systems fall short of drawing the conclusions which follow from such a
recognition. At present I will only quote from one instance, which will serve to
illustrate the meaning and importance of this principle that good
is
indefinable, or, as Prof. Sidgwick says, an
unanalysable notion.
It is an instance to which Prof. Sidgwick himself refers in a note on the passage,
in which he argues that ought
is unanalysable. (§ 14
¶ 1)
Bentham,
says Sidgwick, explains that his fundamental
principle
; and yet
states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in
question as being the right and proper end of human action
his language in other passages of the same chapter would seem to imply
that he means by the word right
conducive to the general
happiness.
Prof. Sidgwick sees that, if you take these two statements
together, you get the absurd result that greatest happiness is the end of
human action, which is conducive to the general happiness
; and so absurd
does it seem to him to call this result, as Bentham calls it, the fundamental
principle of a moral system,
that he suggests that Bentham cannot have meant
it. Yet Prof. Sidgwick himself states elsewhere that
Psychological Hedonism is not seldom confounded with Egoistic Hedonism
;
and that confusion, as we shall see, rests chiefly on that same fallacy, the
naturalistic fallacy, which is implied in Bentham’s statements. Prof. Sidgwick admits therefore that this fallacy is
sometimes committed, absurd as it is; and I am inclined to think that Bentham
may really have been one of those who committed it. Mill, as we shall see,
certainly did commit it. In any case, whether Bentham committed it or not, his
doctrine, as above quoted, will serve as a very good illustration of this
fallacy, and of the importance of the contrary proposition that good is
indefinable. (§ 14 ¶ 2)
Let us consider this doctrine. Bentham seems to imply, so Prof.
Sidgwick says, that the word right
means conducive to general
happiness.
Now this, by itself, need not necessarily involve the
naturalistic fallacy. For the word right
is very commonly appropriated to
actions which lead to the attainment of what is good; which are regarded as
means to the ideal and not as ends-in-themselves. This use of
right
, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it also be
good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word. Had Bentham
been using right
in this sense, it might be perfectly consistent for him
to define right as conducive to the general happiness
provided only (and note this proviso) he had already proved, or laid
down as an axiom, that general happiness was the good, or (what is
equivalent to this) that general happiness alone was good. For in that case he
would have already defined the good as general happiness (a position
perfectly consistent, we have seen, with the contention that good
is
indefinable), and, since right was to be defined as conducive to the
good,
it would actually mean conducive to general happiness.
But this method of escape from the charge of having committed the naturalistic
fallacy has been closed by Bentham himself. For his fundamental principle is, we
see, that the greatest happiness of all concerned is the right and
proper end of human action. He applies the word right,
therefore, to the end, as such, not only to the means which are conducive to it;
and that being so, right can no longer be defined as conducive to the general
happiness,
without involving the fallacy in question. For now it is obvious
that the definition of right as conducive to general happiness can be used by
him in support of the fundamental principle that general happiness is the right
end; instead of being itself derived from that principle. If right, by
definition, means conducive to general happiness, then it is obvious that
general happiness is the right end. It is not necessary now first to prove or
assert that general happiness is the right end, before right is defined as
conducive to general happiness—a perfectly valid procedure; but on the
contrary the definition of right as conducive to general happiness proves
general happiness to be the right end—a perfectly invalid procedure, since
in this case the statement that general happiness is the right end of human
action
is not an ethical principle at all, but either, as we have seen, a
proposition about the meaning of words, or else a proposition about the
nature of general happiness, not about its rightness or its goodness.
(§ 14 ¶ 3)
Now, I do not wish the importance I assign to this fallacy to be misunderstood. The discovery of it does not at all refute Bentham’s contention that greatest happiness is the proper end of human action, if that be understood as an ethical proposition, as he undoubtedly intended it. That principle may be true all the same; we shall consider whether it is so in the succeeding chapters. Bentham might have maintained it, as Prof. Sidgwick does, even if the fallacy had been pointed out to him. What I am maintaining is that the reasons which he actually gives for his ethical proposition are fallacious ones so far as they consist in a definition of right. What I suggest is that he did not perceive them to be fallacious; that, if he had done so, he would have been led to seek for other reasons in support of his Utilitarianism; and that, had he sought for other reasons, he might have found none which he thought to be sufficient. In that case he would have changed his whole system—a most important consequence. It is undoubtedly also possible that he would have thought other reasons to be sufficient, and in that case his ethical system, in its main results, would still have stood. But, even in this latter case, his use of the fallacy would be a serious objection to him as an ethical philosopher. For it is the business of Ethics, I must insist, not only to obtain true results, but also to find valid reasons for them. The direct object of Ethics is knowledge and not practice; and any one who uses the naturalistic fallacy has certainly not fulfilled this first object, however correct his practical principles may be. (§ 14 ¶ 4)
My objections to Naturalism are then, in the first place, that it
offers no reason at all, far less any valid reason, for any ethical principle
whatever; and in this it already fails to satisfy the requirements of Ethics, as
a scientific study. But in the second place I contend that, though it gives a
reason for no ethical principle, it is the cause of the acceptance of
false principles—it deludes the mind into accepting ethical principles,
which are false; and in this it is contrary to every aim of Ethics. It is easy
to see that if we start with a definition of right conduct as conduct conducive
to general happiness; then, knowing that right conduct is universally conduct
conducive to the good, we very easily arrive at the result that the good is
general happiness. If, on the other hand, we once recognise that we must start
our Ethics without a definition, we shall be much more apt to look about us,
before we adopt any ethical principle whatever, and the more we look about us,
the less likely we are to adopt a false one. It may be replied to this: Yes, but
we shall look about us just as much, before we settle on our definition, and are
therefore just as likely to be right. But I will try to shew that this is not
the case. If we start with the conviction that a definition of good can be
found, we start with the conviction that the good can mean nothing else
than some one property of things, and our only business will then be to discover
what that property is. But if we recognise that, so far as the meaning of good
goes, anything whatever may be good, we start with a much more open mind.
Moreover, apart from the fact that, when we think we have a definition, we
cannot logically defend our ethical principles in any way whatever, we shall
also be much less apt to defend them well, even if illogically. For we shall
start with the conviction that good must mean so and so, and shall therefore be
inclined either to misunderstand our opponent’s arguments or to cut them
short with the reply, This is not an open question: the very meaning of the
word decides it; no one can think otherwise except through confusion.
(§ 14 ¶ 5)
§ 14, n. 1: Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, Chap. iii, § 1 (6th edition). ↩