Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 15.
Our first
conclusion as to the subject-matter of Ethics is, then, that there is a simple,
indefinable, unanalysable object of thought by reference to which it must be
defined. By what name we call this unique object is a matter of indifference, so
long as we clearly recognise what it is and that it does differ from other
objects. The words which are commonly taken as the signs of ethical judgments
all do refer to it; and they are expressions of ethical judgments solely because
they do so refer. But they may refer to it in two different ways, which it is
very important to distinguish, if we are to have a complete definition of the
range of ethical judgments. Before I proceeded to argue that there was such an
indefinable notion involved in ethical notions, I stated (§ 4) that it was necessary for Ethics to enumerate all true
universal judgments, asserting that such and such a thing was good, whenever it
occurred. But, although all such judgments do refer to that unique notion which
I have called good,
they do not all refer to it in the same way. They may
either assert that this unique property does always attach to the thing in
question, or else they may assert only that the thing in question is a cause
or necessary condition for the existence of other things to which this
unique property does attach. The nature of these two species of universal
ethical judgments is extremely different; and a great part of the difficulties,
which are met with in ordinary ethical speculation, are due to the failure to
distinguish them clearly. Their difference has, indeed, received expression in
ordinary language by the contrast between the terms good as means
and
good in itself,
value as a means
and intrinsic value.
But
those terms are apt to be applied correctly only in the more obvious instances;
and this seems to be due to the fact that the distinction between the
conceptions which they denote has not been made a separate object of
investigation. This distinction may be briefly pointed out as follows. (§ 15 ¶ 1)