Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 4.
But there is another meaning which may be given to the question
What is good?
Books are good
would be an answer to it, though an
answer obviously false; for some books are very bad indeed. And ethical
judgments of this kind do indeed belong to Ethics; though I shall not deal with
many of them. Such is the judgment Pleasure is good
—a judgment, of
which Ethics should discuss the truth, although it is not nearly as important as
that other judgment, with which we shall be much occupied
presently—Pleasure alone is good.
It is judgments of this
sort, which are made in such books on Ethics as contain a list of
virtues
—in Aristotle’s Ethics
for example. But it is
judgments of precisely the same kind, which form the substance of what is
commonly supposed to be a study different from Ethics, and one much less
respectable—the study of Casuistry. We may be told that Casuistry differs
from Ethics in that it is much more detailed and particular, Ethics much more
general. But it is most important to notice that Casuistry does not deal with
anything that is absolutely particular—particular in the only sense in
which it a perfectly precise line can be drawn between it and what is general.
It is not particular in the sense just noticed, the sense in which this book is
a particular book, and A’s friend’s advice particular advice.
Casuistry may indeed be more particular and Ethics more
general; but that means they differ only in degree and not in kind. And this is
universally true of particular
and general,
when used in this
common, but inaccurate, sense. So far as Ethics allows itself to give lists of
virtues or even to name constituents of the Ideal, it is indistinguishable from
Casuistry. Both alike deal with what is general, in the sense in which physics
and chemistry deal with what is general. Just as chemistry aims at discovering
what are the properties of oxygen, wherever it occurs, and not only of
this or that particular specimen of oxygen; so Casuistry aims at discovering
what actions are good, whenever they occur. In this respect Ethics and
Casuistry alike are to be classed with such sciences as physics, chemistry, and
physiology, in their absolute distinction from those of which history and
geography are instances. And it is to be noted that, owing to their detailed
nature, casuistical investigations are actually nearer to physics and to
chemistry than are the investigations usually assigned to Ethics. For just as
physics cannot rest content with the discovery that light is propagated by waves
of ether, but must go on to discover the particular nature of the ether-waves
corresponding to each several colour; so Casuistry, not content with the general
law that charity is a virtue must attempt to discover the relative merits of
every different form of charity. Casuistry forms, therefore, part of the ideal
of ethical science: Ethics cannot be complete without it. The defects of
Casuistry are not defects of principle; no objection can be taken to its aim and
object. It has failed only because it is far too difficult a subject to be
treated adequately in our present state of knowledge. The casuist has been
unable to distinguish, in the cases which he treats, those elements upon which
their value depends. Hence he often thinks two cases to be alike in respect of
value, when in reality they are alike only in some other respect. It is to
mistakes of this kind that the pernicious influence of such investigations has
been due. For Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation. It cannot be
safely attempted at the beginning of our studies, but only at the end. (§ 4 ¶ 1)