Chapter I: The Subject-Matter of Ethics.
§ 5.
But our question What is good?
may still have another
meaning. We may, in the third place, mean to ask, not what thing or things are
good, but how good
is to be defined. This is an enquiry which belongs
only to Ethics, not to Casuistry; and this is the enquiry which will occupy us
first. (§ 5 ¶ 1)
It is an enquiry to which most special attention should be directed;
since this question, how good
is to be defined, is the most fundamental
question in all Ethics. That which is meant by good
is, in fact, except
its converse bad,
the only simple object of thought which is
peculiar to Ethics. Its definition is, therefore, the most essential point in
the definition of Ethics; and moreover a mistake with regard to it entails a far
larger number of erroneous ethical judgments than any other. Unless this first
question be fully understood, and its true answer clearly recognised, the rest
of Ethics is as good as useless from the point of view of systematic knowledge.
True ethical judgments, of the two kinds last dealt with, may indeed be made by
those who do not know the answer to this question as well as by those who do;
and it goes without saying that the two classes of people may live equally good
lives. But it is extremely unlikely that the most general ethical
judgments will be equally valid, in the absence of a true answer to this
question; I shall presently try to shew that the gravest errors have been
largely due to beliefs in a false answer. And, in any case, it is impossible
that, till the answer to this question be known, any one should know what is
the evidence for any ethical judgment whatsoever. But the main object of
Ethics, as a systematic science, is to give correct reasons for
thinking that this or that is good; and, unless this question be answered, such
reasons cannot be given. Even, therefore, apart from the fact that a false
answer leads to false conclusions, the present enquiry is a most necessary and
important part of the science of Ethics. (§ 5 ¶ 2)