Let us see then exactly to what point the course of our argument has carried us. We have felt compelled by the very considerations that led us to regard the preference of other people's well-being to our own as rational, to treat such a preference on our part as intrinsically better even for ourselves. We have in fact (with Kant) recognized the existence of two prima facie rational ends--Virtue and Happiness, the latter being treated as part of the true well-being of man only in so far as is consistent with the predominance of Virtue.(Bk. 1 Ch. 3 § 4 ¶ 1)

It has been objected, indeed, to such a position, both by Professor Sidgwick himself and by others, that such a position involves the admission of two heterogeneous and incommensurable ends--Virtue and happiness. To this we may reply that the very ground on which we have felt bound to recognize Virtue as an end in itself compels us to regard it as an end superior in value to pleasure. Reason pronounces that there is an end which all human acts should aim at promoting, i. e. the general good, and that no state of a rational will can be regarded by Reason as good which is not directed towards that end; and a will which did not regard the choice of the right as of superior value to pleasure would not be a will directed to that supreme end. The man who acted upon the hypothesis that his own virtue and his own pleasure possessed equal intrinsic value would not really be virtuous at all. The hypothesis is therefore one which contradicts itself. And the principle that the will directed towards the good must be regarded as of more value than the agent's pleasure will equally compel us to regard the pleasure of others as an intrinsically valuable end only in so far as it is consistent with the like preference of the good to the pleasant in those others. In other words, pleasure can only be regarded as intrinsically valuable in so far as it is consistent with Morality. No doubt the dualism, the absolute antagonism between the two ends, the impossibility of fusing them into a harmonious whole in which the sharp contrast between them is lost (so long as all pleasure is put on the same level and is regarded as something which Virtue must simply limit from the outside without modifying and transforming), may be a reason for suspecting that we have not yet reached an adequate and complete view of the elements contained in the good. But there is no absolute logical contradiction involved in such a position; it is not open to the charge that the two ends or elements of the end are incommensurable.(Bk. 1 Ch. 3 § 4 ¶ 2)

Now, practically, the introduction of this principle--the principle that Virtue must be regarded as an element and as the dominant element, in the good--will by itself do much to bring our view of the ethical criterion into harmony with ordinarily accepted moral ideas, and to remove some of the more glaring difficulties of Utilitarianism as commonly understood. For (1) the most glaring of all the inconsistencies between Utilitarianism and the deliverances of the ordinary, unsophisticated moral consciousness, lies precisely in its refusing to recognize the intrinsic goodness of Virtue. (2) The inclusion of Virtue (which for the present we take to mean rational Benevolence^[61]) in our conception of the end allows us to exclude from it excessive indulgence in the pleasures which we recognize as good in themselves, and also all pleasures which are inconsistent with the predominance of Benevolence, e. g. the pleasures of cruelty. We shall not merely disallow them on account of their infelicific effects, but we shall regard them as intrinsically worthless or bad, because they imply an indifference to the good: we shall condemn the man who voluntarily indulges his taste for them, even though accidentally (as in an arena, for instance, in which the combatants were condemned criminals) he might be able to indulge them in a way not immediately inconsistent with the public interest. (3) We shall attach a high intrinsic value to such pleasures as actually include a benevolent element, and a lower degree of intrinsic superiority to such pleasures as are actually conducive to the public good, though the public good may be no part of the motive of the person indulging in them. Under the first head we should include the actual pleasures of Benevolence or personal affection, and even to some small extent the pleasures of sociability and friendship in so far as these imply some degree of unselfish good-will to others. Under the second we should include the pleasures of ambition or emulation and the whole range of aesthetic and intellectual pleasures.(Bk. 1 Ch. 3 § 4 ¶ 3)

In this way it would probably be possible to justify, on the whole, that preference for what are commonly called higher pleasures which is so clear an element of the ordinary moral consciousness; since it will be generally admitted that in the long run inuldgence in social and intellectual pleasures is more beneficial in its indirect social effects than indulgence in mere sensual gratification or unintellectual amusement. But so far we have interpreted Virtue as including nothing but Benevolence, or rather Benevolence (and in due subordination thereto) Prudence; we have admitted no ground for ascribing superior moral value to one pleasure over another except its direct or indirect influence on the pleasure of others. It is now time to ask whether this limitation really corresponds to the deliverances of the moral consciousness. Is there no element in consciousness to which we should upon reflection ascribe intrinsic value except (1) Virtue in the sense of simple Benevolence and (2) Pleasure with a preference for social useful pleasures? Is our conception of the summum bonum for a rational being limited to these two elements? If his will invariably prefers (in case of collision) other people's pleasure to his own and if he enjoys as much pleasure as possible, should we say that a human being has all that it is reasonable for him to want? Would a community of simple people enjoying material plenty and innocent amusements in the utmost degree that is consistent with the predominance of the most intense and most universal love--the life for instance of some rude Moravian Mission Settlement--beautiful and noble as such a life might be, realize to the full our highest ideal of human life? Would a community devoid of Letters, of Art, of Learning, of any intellectual cultivation beyond that low elementary school standard which might be regarded as absolutely necessary to Virtue and to the enjoyable filling up of leisure--would such a state of society realize our ideal? If it were certain (a by no means extreme supposition) that the communities which have approximated most nearly to this pattern have actually realized a higher average of enjoyment than has ever been attained in more ambitious societies, should we thereupon think it right to adopt an obscurantist policy, to burn down libraries and museums and picture galleries, and to repress all desires for knowledge and beauty which should soar above the standard indicated? Do we not rather judge that such desires ought to be gratified, that in their gratification--nay, in the effort to satisfy desires which grow stronger with every partial satisfaction--lies one large element of true human good, one large source of its nobleness and its value? And can such conviction be based upon the extremely dubious calculation that the pleasures resulting from such pursuits or produced by them in others are invariably intenser, when due allowance is made for the increasing susceptibility to pain which they bring with them, than those attainable by the healthy and moderate pursuit of more animal satisfactions in due subordination to the activities of social Morality? Should we really be prepared to condemn any study, say that of pure Mathematics, which could be shown to be less felicific than Sciences and Arts of more immediate and obvious utility? To all these questions I can only answer for myself No. Argument on questions of ultimate ends is impossible. All that I can do is trace the further modifications which this admission of other ends besides Virtue and happiness will compel us to make in the system of rationalistic Utilitarianism, from which we have already diverged by making Virtue as well as happiness into an element, and the more important element, in our conception of the ultimate end. The view to which we have been led may be briefly expressed as follows. The human soul is a trinity. Consciousness includes three elements or aspects or distinguishable activities--Thought, Feeling, and Volition or (to use a more general term) Conation, each of which is unintelligible in entire abstraction or separation from the rest. There is a good state and a bad state of intellect, of feeling, and of will. The good consists in a certain state of all three of them. It may be true in a certain rough and popular sense that in thought and perhaps even in the good will, taken in absolute abstraction from the two others, we could discover no value at all, while in pleasure we could find such a value^[62]. That is the assumption upon which all Hedonism is based; and the assumption might perhaps be admitted, though we might refuse to admit the inferences based upon it, if we could attach any meaning to pleasure taken absolutely by itself. But it is often forgotten that there is no such thing as pleasure without a content, and this content which makes the state of consciousness pleasant or unpleasant, is, at least in rational beings, dependent upon the other two aspects of consciousness. It is no doubt possible by an effort of abstraction to think only of the intensity of our pleasurable feelings without thinking of their content, and to make their value depend upon that intensity, but there is no ground whatever for assuming that we actually do so or ought to do so. In judging of the ultimate value of any state of consciousness we think of its content--of the state of desire and of will on the one hand and of intellect on the other, as well as of feeling, and of the content of feeling as well as of its intensity. Sometimes we pronounce a less pleasant state of consciousness to be more valuable than a more pleasant one because it involves an activity of the higher intellectual faculties, or because it represents the direction of the will to a higher good. Sometimes, no doubt, the different parts of our nature represented by the trinity of thought, feeling, and will cannot all obtain equal satisfaction by the same course of action, and then we have to choose between a course which will satisfy one part of our nature and that which will satisfy the other; but the ideal good of men would include all three. It would include truth and activity of thought, pleasantness of feeling, and goodness of will. In what relation the goods predominantly connected with each of these three elements of our nature stand to each other, we shall in some general way consider hereafter^[63]. It will be enough to say here that we have already recognized the supreme value of the good will, i.e. of the devotion of the will towards that which the moral consciousness recognizes as the good for humanity at large, that in the abstract we recognize the superior value of intellectual activities to mere pleasant feeling, while the superiority of certain states of pleasant feeling to others is largely due to their arising to a greater extent than others from the activity of the two higher elements in our nature, the activity of the good will or of the intellect, or both.(Bk. 1 Ch. 3 § 4 ¶ 4)