The Religion of Nature delineated

• Edition of 1750; originally published 1722.
• by William Wollaston

Sect. I. Of Moral Good and Evil.

The foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which distinguishes them into good, evil, indifferent. For if there is such a difference, there must be religion; & contra. Upon this account it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general idea, or some rule, by comparing the foresaid acts with which it might appear, to which kind they respectively belong. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there must be. That, which I am going to propose, has always seemd to me not only evidently true, but withal so obvious and plain, that perhaps for this very reason it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the use and application of it is so easy, that if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themselves to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; that is, whether they are disagreeable to it, or not. I shall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning. (Sect. I ¶ 1)

I. That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself: or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent. Because in proper speaking no act at all can be ascribed to that, which is not induced with these capacities. For that, which cannot distinguish, cannot choose: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choosing for itself, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a necessity incumbent ab extra. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only an instrument in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said to act, but to be acted. The act must be the act of an agent: therefore not of his instrument. (Sect. I ¶ 2)

A being under the above-mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a machine: to which no language or philosophy ever ascribed ἤθη or mores. (Sect. I ¶ 3)

II. Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs, by which things are exprest, to the things themselves. Defin. (Sect. I ¶ 4)

III. A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition. It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and gestures. Every body understands weeping, laughing, shrugs, frowns, &c. these are a sort of universal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintained only by casts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muscles. And we read of feet, that speak; of a philosopher, who answered an argument by only getting up and walking around; and of one, who pretended to express the same sentence as many ways by gesticulation, as even Cicero himself could by all his copia of words and eloquence. But these instances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of other kinds, such as constitute the character of a man’s conduct in life, which have in nature, and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a signification, and to imply some proposition, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what such acts declare to be, is not, they must contradict truth, as much as any false proposition or assertion can. (Sect. I ¶ 5)

If a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were not enemies, would not this military language declare what was false? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happend to the Athenians in the attack of Epipolæ, or to the Carthaginians in their last incampment against Agathocles in Africa. Suppose then, instead of this firing, some officer to have said they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? the truth or falshood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer’s knowledge or ignorance: because there is a certain sense affixt to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The thing is the very same still, if into the place of words be substituted actions. The sluate here was in nature the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any spectator would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either true or false: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence. (Sect. I ¶ 6)

When Popilius Lænus solicited to have Cicero proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner, would not his carriage have sufficiently signified to any one, who was ignorant of the case, that Tully either was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured this man; or at least had not saved his life, nor had as much reason to expect his service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect Tully’s? And all these things being false, were not his behaviour and actions expressive of that which was false, or contradictions to truth? It is certain he acted as if those things had been true, which were not true, and if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had said they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were so: why then should not to act as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwise, contradict truth as much as to say they were so, when they were not so? (Sect. I ¶ 7)

A pertinacious objector may perhaps still say, it is the business of soldiers to defend themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to prosecute such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that those acts of defending and prosecuting speak or signify so much: but conjectures are raised upon the common sense, which mankind has of such proceedings. Ans. If it be natural to conclude any thing from them, do they not naturally convey the notice of something to be concluded? andwhat is conveying the notice of anything but notifying or signifying that thing? And then again, if this signification is natural and founded in the common principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which results only from the use of some particular place or country, as that of language doth? (Sect. I ¶ 8)

If A should enter into a compact with B, by which he promises and ingages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this case it must be granted, that his act interferes with his promise, and is contrary to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that proposition, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a compact subsisting. If this proposition be true, A made such a certain agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B. Why? Because the truth of this latter is inconsistent with the agreement asserted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this inconsistence. If then the behaviour of A be inconsistent with the agreement mentioned in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by A’s behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other proposition. Or thus, If one proposition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is contained in another, it is said to contradict this other, and denies the existence of what is containd in it. Just so if one act imports what is contrary to the import of another, it contradicts this other, and denies its existence. In a word, if A by his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath subjected himself, his actions deny them; just as we say, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motions of the earth, or his writings deny it. (Sect. I ¶ 9)

When the question was asked, Whose sheep are these? the answer was Ægon’s: for he committed them to my care (he uses and disposes of them as his). By this act Damætas understood them to be his; and if they had not been his, but Alphondas’s or Melibæus’s, Ægon, by an act very intelligible to Damætus, had expressed what was not true. What is said here is the stronger, because he, who has the use and disposal of any thing, has all that he can have of it; and v. v. he who has all (or property) of any thing, must have all the use and disposal of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be his, than by using it, &c. But of this something more hereafter. (Sect. I ¶ 10)

In the Jewish history we read, that when Abimelek saw Isaac sporting with Rebekah, and taking conjugal liberties, he presently knew her to be Isaac’s wife; and if she had not been his wife, the case had been as in the preceding instance. If it be objected, that she might have been his mistress or a harlot; I answer, that so she might have been, tho Isaac had told him by words that she was his wife. And it is sufficient for my purpose, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allowd to express things as plainly and determinately as words can. Certainly Abimelek gave greater credit to that information which passed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear; and to what Isaac did, than to what he said. For Isaac had told him, that she was not his wife, but his sister. (Sect. I ¶ 11)

A certain author writes to this purpose, If a soldier, who had taken the oath to Cæsar, should run over to the enemy, and serve him against Cæsar, and after that be taken; would he not be punishd as a deserter, and a perjured villain? And if he should plead for himself, that he never denied Cæsar; would it not be answered, That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions (or by facts) he did? And in another place, Let us, says he, suppose some tyrant command a Christian to burn incense to Jupiter, without adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Christ: if the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, that by that very act he denied him; (and I may add, consequently denied those propositions which affirm him to be the Christ, a teacher of true religion, and the like)? (Sect. I ¶ 12)

When a man lives, as if he had the estate which he has not, or was in other regards (all fairly cast up) what he is not, what judgment is to be passed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breathe untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he lives a lye? (Sect. I ¶ 13)

In common speech we say some actions are insignificant, which would not be sense, if there wree not some that are significant, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either significant or insignificant. (Sect. I ¶ 14)

It may not be improperly observed the way,that the significancy here attributed to mens acts, proceedsnot always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people, as that of words and sounds mostly doth. Acts of the later kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary significations. The generality of Christians, when they pray, take off their hats: the Jews, when they pray or say any of their Barakoth, put them on. The same thing which among Christians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the Jews. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one’s health) is in itself an indifferent thing, and people by usage or consent may make it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the former kind, such as I chiefly here intend, have an unalterable signification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. Ægon’s treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to signify, that it was not his. From whence it appears, that facts express more strongly, even than words themselves; or to contradict any proposition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words only. Words are but arbitrary signs of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes poverty, in another denotes riches): but facts may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the thoughts themselves produced into act; as the very conceptions of mind brought forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and express representations of them. And beside this, they bear certain respects to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any ratio’s are in mathematics. For the facts and the things they respect are just what they are, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects interceding between those must be as fixt, as the ratio is which one of these bears to the other: that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things cease to be what they are. (Sect. I ¶ 15)

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict those propositions, which assert them to be as they are. (Sect. I ¶ 16)

IV. No act (whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. For, (Sect. I ¶ 17)

1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong, that act which implies such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice. (Sect. I ¶ 18)

2. Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the relation between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determind and fixt by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves too), and consequently be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in opposition to truth, or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth. (Sect. I ¶ 19)

3. If there is a supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either causes, or permits to be; then to own things to be as they are is to own what He causes, or at least permits, to be thus caused or permitted: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, reveald in the books of nature. To do this therefore must be agreeable to His will. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and, since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly wrong. (Sect. I ¶ 20)

   I desire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is ill done by them, should be so done; i.e. that they should use their liberty ill: but I say, when they have done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we should allow it to have been committed: or, it would be disagreeable to His will, that we should deny it to have been committed. (Sect. I ¶ 21)

   As the owning of things, in all our conduct to be as they are, is direct obedience: so the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been that are or have been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion against Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much to say, God indeed causes such a thing to be, or at least permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies between this and that, is of such a nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, &c. this is true: but yet to me it shall not be so: I will not indure it, or act as if it were so: the laws of nature are ill framed, no will I mind them, or what follows from them: even existence shall be non-existence, when my pleasures require. Such an impious declaration as this attends every voluntary infraction of truth. (Sect. I ¶ 22)

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any instance or manner whatsoever, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: every thing is what it is, that which is done, cannot be undone; and the like. And then if those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to His government or soveraignty, but to His nature also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most wrong. (Sect. I ¶ 23)

   Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better represented thus. If there are such things as axioms, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always known to God to be so, the truth of them cannot be denied in any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the Divine knowledge must be denied too. (Sect. I ¶ 24)

5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for streight, &c. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, no thing does exist, if things are not what they are. (Sect. I ¶ 25)

   To talk to a post, or otherwise treat it as if it was a man, would surely be reckond an absurdity, if not distrction. Why? because this is to treat it as being what it is not. And why should not the converse be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a post; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do. (Sect. I ¶ 26)

Lastly, To deny things to be as they are is a transgression of the great law of our nature, the law of reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. But of this more in the proper place. (Sect. I ¶ 27)

Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature, and great force of truth. If I may judge by what I feel myself, the least truth cannot be contradicted without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more than displase; it is shocking. (Sect. I ¶ 28)

V. What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition. (Sect. I ¶ 29)

Nothing can be asserted or denied by any act with regard to those things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts do bear such relations to other things, as to be declaratory of something concerning them, this commonly is visible; and it is not difficult to determin, whether truth suffers by them, or not. Some things cannot possibly be done, but truth must be directly and positively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the cases arising from omissions are not always so well determined, and plain: it is not always easy to know when or how far truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude must be allowd, and much must be left to every one’s own judgment and ingenuity. (Sect. I ¶ 30)

This may be said in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting, the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth. And there may be omissions in other cases, that are silent as to truth. But yet there are some neglects or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with it (or, with some true propositions). (Sect. I ¶ 31)

We before supposed A to have engaged not to do some certain thing, &c. if now, on the other side, he should by some solemn promise, oath, or other act undertake to do some certain thing before such a time, and he voluntarily omits to do it, he would behave himself as if there had been no such promise or engagement; which is equal to denying that there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former instance. (Sect. I ¶ 32)

Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied. If a man does not desire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his own nature and the nature and definition of happiness to be what they are. And then further, willingly to neglect the means, leading to any such end, is the same as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and that may be considered as an act, many omissions of this kind may be turned over to the other side, and brought under the foregoing proposition. (Sect. I ¶ 33)

It must be confest there is a difficulty as to the means, by which we are to consult our own preservation and happiness; to know what those are, and what they are with respect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: some labor under disadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in such an irregular distemperd world, and of those many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our measures, deprive us of certainty in these matters. But still we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can; and the neglect to do this will be an omission within the reach of the proposition. (Sect. I ¶ 34)

There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be enumerated to these by being either total, or notorious, or upon the score of some other circumstance. It is certain I should not deny the Phœnissae of Euripides to be an excellent drama by not reading it: nor do I deny Chihil-menâr to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to see it. But should I, having leisure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my mind, and attain such knowledge as may be useful to me, I should then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precisely, into what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after knowledge, and where the discontinuance begins to be no offence against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himself as well as he can. This is one of those cases which I said before were not so well determind. (Sect. I ¶ 35)

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be poor, any more than I should deny a man to have a squalid beard by not shaving him, to be nasty by not washing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back. (Sect. I ¶ 36)

Many things are here taken into consideration (accoring to the next proposition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by doing this; and then I cannot by not doing it. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then something in charity to the poor, should yet never give them any thing at all, I should then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is: and thus the truth would be injured. So, again, (Sect. I ¶ 37)

If I should not say my prayers at such a certain hour, or in such a certain place and manner, this would not imply a denial of the existence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him: nay, there may be reasons perhaps against that particular time, place, manner. But if I should never pray to Him, or worship Him at all, such a total omission would be equivalent to this assertion, There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored: which, if there is such a being, must be contrary to truth. Also generally and notoriously to neglect this duty (permit me to call it so), tho not quite always, will favor, if not directly proclaim the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner is only to worship him accidentally, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is possible to a total neglect. Beside, such a sparing and infrequent worshiper of the Deity betrays such an habitual disregard of Him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null. (Sect. I ¶ 38)

Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, faln down, alone, and without present help like to perish, or see his house on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my assistance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this refusing to do it according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is; human nature to be what it is; and even those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to myself I should have under the like misfortune, to be what they are. (Sect. I ¶ 39)

VI. In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considerd not only what it is in itself or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by fact or practice: and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in. (Sect. I ¶ 40)

If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding him to us him as a horse, but not the horse of another man, who gave him no license to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the respect he bears to his true owner. But it is not necessary perhaps to consider what he is in respect to his color, shape or age: because the thief’s riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, &c.. I say therefore, that those, and all those properties, respects, and circumstances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into consideration. For otherwise the thing to be confined is but imperfectly surveyd; and the whole compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in part only, and in other respects perhaps as being what it is not. (Sect. I ¶ 41)

If a rich man being upon a journey, should be robbed and stript, it would be a second robbery and injustice committed upon him to take from him a part of his then character, and to consider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a rich man robbed and abused, and indeed at that time a poor man and distrest, tho able to repay afterwards the assistance lent him. (Sect. I ¶ 42)

Moreover a man in giving assistance of any kind to another should consider what his own circumstances are, as well as what the other’s are. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he should give it, and by that deny his own or his family’s circumstances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And since (as I have observed already) all truths are consistent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a right light, and the case properly stated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly said to want assistance, but not the assistance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be said to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what the latter is with respect to the former. (Sect. I ¶ 43)

The case becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under some promise or compact to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do these, if he does that, effectually. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite truths, but there are truths on opposite sides. I ansewr: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot be both A’s duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call mixt, may arise out of those differing considerations. A should assist B; but so, as not to neglect himself and his family, &c. and so to take care of himself and family, as not to forget the other ingagement, as well and honestly as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some exception on limitation understood. It is not in man’s power to promise absolutely. He can only promise as one, who may be disabled by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing. (Sect. I ¶ 44)

I could here insert many instances of partial thinking, which occur in authors: but I shall choose only to set one down in the margin. (Sect. I ¶ 45)

In short, when things are truly estimated, persons concerned, times, places, ends intended, and effects that naturally follow, most be added to them. (Sect. I ¶ 46)

VII. When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right: likewise when the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i.e. not omitting it) must be right. Because contrariorum contraria est ratio. (Sect. I ¶ 47)

VIII. Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right. (Sect. I ¶ 48)

IX. Every act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions which interfere with true (i.e. deny any proposition to be true, which is true; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) are morally evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent. (Sect. I ¶ 49)

I would have it to be minded well, that when I speak of acts inconsistent with truth, I mean any truth; any true proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of speculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be what in fact and truth it is. (Sect. I ¶ 50)

It may be of use also to remember, that I have added those words in some degree or other. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may compromise matters of very different importance; or more truths may be violated one way than another: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) said to be crimes, but not equal crimes. If A steals a book from B which was pleasing and useful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whose happiness partly depends upon it: but still if A should deprive B of a good estate, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we suppose the book to be worth to him one pound, and the estate 10000 l. that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his estate. It is the same as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one eqal to 10000 must be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, sure. Then, tho the convenience and innocent pleasure, that B found in the use of the book, was a degree of happiness: yet the happiness accruing to him from the estate, by which he was supplied not only with necessaries, but also with many other comforts and harmless injoyments, vastly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former case was, B had a property in that, which gave him such a degree of happiness: that violated in the latter, B had a property in that, which gave him a happiness vastly superior to the other. The violation therefore in the latter case is upon this account a vastly greater violation than in the former. Lastly, the truths violated in the former case might end in B, those in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who subsist also by the estate, and are to be provided for out of it. And these truths are very many in respect of every one of them, and all their descendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the importance and number of truths violated. I shall only add, on the other side, that the value of good actions will rise at least in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omission of them: and that therefore they cannot be equal, any more than the opposite evil omissions. (Sect. I ¶ 51)

But let us return to that, which is our main subject, the distinction between moral good and evil. Some have been so wild as to deny that there is any such thing: but from what has been said here, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral good and evil as there is true and false; and that there is as natural and immutable, a difference between those as between these, the difference at the bottom being indeed the same. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they want some Criterion, or mark, by the help of which they might know them asunder. And others there are, who pretend to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared, and may be discriminated; or that ultimate end, to which all ought to be referred: but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm, or (so far as it is just) reducible to my rule. For (Sect. I ¶ 52)

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call honestum, may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the cause or end of them: but then what is honestum? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the honestum from the inhonesta. (Sect. I ¶ 53)

They who place all in following nature, if they mean by that phrase acting according to the nature of things (that is, treating things as being what they in nature are, or according to truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature, since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will mislead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose. (Sect. I ¶ 54)

They who make right reason to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them lawful or unlawful, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if right reason is meant that which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have deliverd themselves, is not yet explicit enough. It leaves room for so many disputes and opposite right-reasons, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that his reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends farther: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such matters of fact, as are fairly discoverd to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them. (Sect. I ¶ 55)

They, who contenting themselves with superficial and transient views, deduce the difference between good and evil from the common sense of mankind, and certain principles that are born with us, put the matter upon a very infirm foot. For it is much to be suspected that there are no such innate maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions of education are mistaken for them: and beside that, the sentiments of mankind are not so uniform and constant, as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them. (Sect. I ¶ 56)

They, who own nothing to be good but pleasure, or what they call jucundum, nothing evil but pain, and distinguish things by their tendencies to this or that, do not agree in what this pleasure is to be placed, or by what methods and actings the most of it may be obtaind. These are left to be questions still. As men have different tastes, different degrees of sense and philosophy, the same thing cannot be pleasant to all: and if particular actions are to be proved by this test, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the same act may be of one nature to one man, and of another to another. Beside, unless there be some strong limitation added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to sink into gross voluptuousness, as in fact the generality of Epicurus's herd have done (notwithstanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquility of mind, &c.); and the bridle will be usurped by those appetites which it is a principal part of all religion, natural as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these men say what is intelligible indeed; but what they say is false. For not all pleasures, but only such pleasure as is true, or happiness (of which afterwards), may be reckond among the fines, or ultima bonorum. (Sect. I ¶ 57)

He, who, having considered the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the middle, and seems to raise an idea of it from its situation at an equal distance from the opposite extremes, could only design to be understood of such virtues, as have extremes. It must be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward either extreme, must be so far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the distance, and declines neither way, must be right: also, that this notion supplies us with a good direction for common use in many cases. But then there are several obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: scarce more than such, as respect the virtues couched under the word moderation. And even as to these, it is many times difficult to discern, which is the middle point. This the author himself was sensible of. (Sect. I ¶ 58)

And when his master Plato makes virtue to consist in such a likeness to God, as we are capable of (and God to be the great exemplar), he says what I shall not dispute. But since he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeness, we are little the wiser in point of practice: unless by it we understand the practice of truth, God being truth, and doing nothing contrary to it. (Sect. I ¶ 59)

Whether any of those other foundations, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than these mentiond, I much question. But if the formal ratio of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the truth of the case or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the distinction seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a true proposition and matter of fact is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be easy for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not only words, but also actions with them. A very little skill and attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they speak truth, or not. (Sect. I ¶ 60)

X. If there be moral good and evil, distinguishd as before, there is religion; and such as may most properly be styled natural. By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I say, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done. So that there must be religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral good and evil: because that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms to be done; and so that, which being done would be evil, and implies such absurdities and rebellion against the supreme being, as are mentioned under proposition the IVth. ought most undoubtedly not to be done. And then since there is religion, which follows from the distinction between moral good and evil; since this distinction is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth; and since no proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature: since things are so, there must be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the religion of nature or natural religion; the great law of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we shall afterwards find reason to call it) of the Author of nature is, (Sect. I ¶ 61)

XI. That every intelligent, active, and free being should behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is. (Sect. I ¶ 62)

Objections I am sensible may be made to almost any thing; but I believe none to what has been here advanced but such as may be answerd. For to consider a thing as being something else than what it is, or (which is the same) not to consider it as being what it is, is an absuridty indefensible. However, for a specimen, I will set down a few. Let us suppose some gentleman, who has not sufficiently considerd these matters, amidst his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after some such manner as this, If every thing must be treated as being what it is, what rare work will follow? For 1. to treat my enemy as such is to kill him, or revenge myself soundly upon him. 2. To use a creditor, who is a spend-thrift, or one that knows not the use of money, or has no occasion for it, as such, is not to pay him. Nay further, 3. If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I take it from some body else to supply my own wants? And more, do not I act contrary to truth, if I do not? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a design of killing another, or doing him some great mischief, if he can find him, should ask me where he is, and I know where he is; may notI, to save life, say I do not know, tho that be false? 5. At this rate I may not, in a frolick, break a glass, or burn a book: because forsooth to use these things as being what they are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not burn it. Lastly, how shall a man know what is true: and if he can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it? (Sect. I ¶ 63)

To the first objection it is easy to reply from what has been already said. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was nothing more than his enemy, there might be some force in the objection; but since he may be considerd as something else beside that, he must be used according to what he is in other respects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the first place is a man; and as such may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very sensible part. And then if O and E are fellow-citizens, living under the same government, and subject to laws, which are so many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, estate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unless he treats him also as one, who by common consent is under such a protection. If he does otherwise, he denies the existence of the foresaid laws and public compacts: contrary to truth. And beside, O should act with respect to himself as being what he is; a man himself, in such or such circumstances, and one who has given up all right to private revenge (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be observed, the result will be this. O must treat E as something compounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: that is, he must only prosecute him in such a way, as is agreeable to the statutes and methods, which the society have obliged themselves to observe. And even as to legal prosecutions, there may be many things still to be considerd. For E may shew himself an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are such things, as really affect the safety or happiness of O or his family, then he will find himself obliged, in duty and submission to truth, to take refuge inthe laws; and to punish E, or obtain satisfaction, and at least security for the future, by the means there prescribed. Because if he does not, he denies the nature and sense of happiness to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we shall shew hereafter he is under to his family, to be what they are; a dangerous and wicked enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the end of laws, and society itself, to be the safety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, punishing offenders, &c. which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity of E rises not beyond trifling, or more tolerable instances, then O might act against truth, if he should be at more charge or hazard in prosecuting E than he can afford, or the thing lost or in danger is worth; should treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a little enemy, as a great one; or should deny to make some allowances, and forgive such pecadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. Lastly, in cases, of which the laws of the place take no notice, truth and nature would be sufficiently observed, if O should keep a vigilant eye upon the steps of his adversary, and take the most prudent measures, that are compatible with the character of a private person, either to asswage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he should only not use him as a friend. For this if he should do, notwithstanding the rants of some men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth. (Sect. I ¶ 64)

The debtor in the second objection, if he acts as he says there, does, in the first place, make himself the judge of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy sentence, an incapacity in effect of having any estate, or any more estate. In the next place, he arrogates to himself more than can be true: that he perfectly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumstances are, but also what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwise. And, which is to be considerd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is supposed to be owing or due to him (otherwise he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, of right is it his (or, it is his). But the debtor by detaining it uses it, as if it was his own, and therefore not the other's; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no such signification. It only signifies, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his: and this it naturally doth signify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not without this. (Sect. I ¶ 65)

Ans. to objection the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that no truth may be denied by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which (by the supposition) is his. The former is only as it were silence, which denies nothing: the latter a direct and loud assertion of a falsity; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no pretence for making another man to pay for his wickedness or folly. We will suppose therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for necessaries, and to have incurred this want through some misfortune, which he could not prevent. In this case, which is put as strong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without trespassing upon truth. The man may be honest labor and industry seek to supply his wants; or he may apply as a supplicant, not as an enemy or robber, to such as can afford to relive him; or if his want is very pressing, to the first persons he meets, whom truth will oblige to assist him according to their abilities: or he may do any thing but violate truth; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as this is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate. Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved sect. vi. to have a right to defend himself and his; and not suffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c. (Sect. I ¶ 66)

Ans. to obj. the 4th. It is certain in the first place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes murder: whoever is accessary to that, offends against many truths of great weight. 2. you are not obliged to answer the furioso's question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore, you may truly deny, that you know where the man is. Lastly, if by not discovering him you should indanger your life (and this is the hardest circumstance, that can be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, If you do not murder such a one, I will murder you. And then be sure you must not commit murder; but must defend yourself against this, as against other dangers, against Banditti, &c. as well as you can. Tho merely to deny truth by words (I mean, when they are not productive of facts to follow; as in judicial transactions, bearing witness, or passing sentence) is not equal to a denial by facts; tho an abuse of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any; tho all sins against truth are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties, as little a one as any; and tho one might look on a man in such a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a man but a mad man: yet truth is sacred, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or taking advantage of some seasonable incident. (Sect. I ¶ 67)

The 5th objection seems to respect inanimate things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is insinuated we shall become obnoxious to many trifling obligations; such as there are mentiond. To this I answer thus. If the glass be nothing else but an useful drinking-glass, and these words fully express what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to break it designedly is to do what is wrong. For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any reason for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glass be poisond: for then it becomes a poisond drinking-glass, and to break or destroy it is to use it according to this true description of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the loss of it, it becomes a glass with that circumstance: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to use it according to what it is. And if it should become by some circumstance useless only, tho there should be no reason for breaking it, yet if there be none against it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This answer, mutatis mutandis, may be adapted to other things of this kind; books, or any thing else. As the usefulness or excellence of some books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to secure them to posterity; so some may be used more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, than by preserving or reading them: the number of which, large enough already, I wish you may not think to be increased by this, which I here send you. (Sect. I ¶ 68)

Here two things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or t'other may be so little as to render the crime evanescent or almost nothing. And, 2. that inanimate beings cannot be considerd as capable of wrong treatment, if the respect they bear to living things is separated from them. The drinking-glass before mentiond could not be considerd as such, or be what it now is, if there was no drinking animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing itself, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are in reference to things that have life. (Sect. I ¶ 69)

The last and most material objection, or question rather, shall be answerd by and by. In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear what, or how things are, then this will be true, that the case or thing under consideration is doubtful: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be one the safer side. Such behaviour shews the case to be as it is. And to the want of power to act agreeably to truth, tht cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he may take to himself the satisfaction, which he will find in sect. IV. (Sect. I ¶ 70)

William Wollaston's The Religion of Nature delineated was first published in 1722. It is now available in the Public Domain.

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