§ 46 n. 1. The excellence of grammar as a guide is proportional to the paucity of inflexions, i.e. to the degree of analysis effected by the language considered. ↩

§ 47 n. 1. This last pair of terms is due to Mr Bradley. ↩

§ 47 n. 2. The notion of a term here set forth is a modification of Mr G. E. Moore's notion of a concept in his article On the Nature of Judgment, Mind, N. S. No. 30, from which notion, however, it differs in some important respects. ↩

§ 47 n. 3. On identity, see Mr G. E. Moore's article in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1900--1901. ↩

§ 48 n. 1. This proposition means A is in this place at this time. It will be shown in Part VII that the relation expressed is not reducible to a two-term relation. ↩

§ 48 n. 2. I use all men as collective, i.e. as nearly synonymous with the human race, but differing therefrom by being many and not one. I shall always use all collectively, confining myself to every for the distributive sense. Thus I shall say every man is mortal, not all men are mortal. ↩

§ 49 n. 1. See the next chapter. ↩

§ 51 n. 1. Logic, Book I, Chap. 1, §§ 17, 18 (pp. 58-60). ↩

§ 55 n. 1. The above argument appears to prove that Mr Moore's theory of universals with numerically diverse instances in his paper on Identity (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1900--1901) must not be applied to all concepts. The relation of an instance to its universal, at any rate, must be actually and numerically the same in all cases where it occurs. ↩