The Principles of Mathematics (1903)

The Principles of Mathematics
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Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell (1907)

Portrait from The Bertrand Russell Gallery

The Principles of Mathematics, by Bertrand Russell, was first published in 1903. This online edition is based on the public domain text as it appears in the 1996 Norton paperback reprint of the 1938 Second Edition (ISBN 0-393-31404-9). (We have been forced to omit Russell’s Introduction to the Second Edition from this online edition, as it is still held under copyright.)

The transcription is currently incomplete. We have placed the parts that have been completed online in the hope that they will be useful.

Table of Contents

  1. Preface

  2. Part I. The Indefinables of Mathematics

    1. Chapter I. Definition of Pure Mathematics

      1. § 1. Definition of pure mathematics
      2. § 2. The principles of mathematics are no longer controversial
      3. § 3. Pure mathematics uses only a few notions, and these are logical constants
      4. § 4. All pure mathematics follows formally from twenty premisses
      5. § 5. Asserts formal implications
      6. § 6. And employs variables
      7. § 7. Which may have any value without exception
      8. § 8. Mathematics deals with types of relations
      9. § 9. Applied mathematics is defined by the occurrence of constants which are not logical.
      10. § 10. Relation of mathematics to logic.

    2. Chapter II. Symbolic Logic

      1. § 11. Definition and scope of symbolic logic
      2. § 12. The indefinables of symbolic logic
      3. § 13. Symbolic logic consists of three parts
      4. The Propositional Calculus
        1. § 14. Definition
        2. § 15. Distinction between implication and formal implication.
        3. § 16. Implication indefinable
        4. § 17. Two indefinables and ten primitive propositions in this calculus
        5. § 18. The ten primitive propositions
        6. § 19. Disjunction and negation defined
      5. The Calculus of Classes
        1. § 20. Three new indefinables
        2. § 21. The relation of an individual to its class
        3. § 22. Propositional functions
        4. § 23. The notion of such that
        5. § 24. Two new primitive propositions
        6. § 25. Relation to propositional calculus
        7. § 26. Identity
      6. The Calculus of Relations
        1. § 27. The logic of relations essential to mathematics
        2. § 28. New primitive propositions
        3. § 29. Relative products
        4. § 30. Relations with assigned domains
      7. Peano's Symbolic Logic
        1. § 31. Mathematical and philosophical definitions
        2. § 32. Peano’s indefinables
        3. § 33. Elementary definitions
        4. § 34. Peano’s primitive propositions
        5. § 35. Negation and disjunction
        6. § 36. Existence and the null-class

    3. Chapter III. Implication and Formal Implication

      1. § 37. Meaning of implication
      2. § 38. Asserted and unasserted propositions
      3. § 39. Inference does not require two premisses
      4. § 40. Formal implication is to be interpreted extensionally
      5. § 41. The variable in formal implication has an unrestricted field
      6. § 42. A formal implication is a single propositional function, not a relation of two
      7. § 43. Assertions
      8. § 44. Conditions that a term in an implication may be varied
      9. § 45. Formal implication involved in rules of inference

    4. Chapter IV. Proper Names, Adjectives and Verbs

      1. § 46. Proper names, adjectives and verbs distinguished
      2. § 47. Terms
      3. § 48. Things and concepts
      4. § 49. Concepts as such and as terms
      5. § 50. Conceptual diversity
      6. § 51. Meaning and the subject-predicate logic
      7. § 52. Verbs and truth
      8. § 53. All verbs, except perhaps is, express relations
      9. § 54. Relations per se and relating relations
      10. § 55. Relations are not particularized by their terms

    5. Chapter V. Denoting

      1. § 56. Definition of denoting
      2. § 57. Connection with subject-predicate propositions
      3. § 58. Denoting concepts obtained from predicates
      4. § 59. Extensional account of all, every, any, a and some
      5. § 60. Intensional account of the same
      6. § 61. Illustrations
      7. § 62. The difference between all, every, etc. lies in the objects denoted, not in the way of denoting them.
      8. § 63. The notion of the and definition
      9. § 64. The notion of the and identity
      10. § 65. Summary

    6. Chapter VI. Classes

      1. § 66. Combination of intensional and extensional standpoints required
      2. § 67. Meaning of class
      3. § 68. Intensional and extensional genesis of classes
      4. § 69. Distinctions overlooked by Peano
      5. § 70. The class as one and as many
      6. § 71. The notion of and
      7. § 72. All men is not analyzable into all and men
      8. § 73. There are null class-concepts, but there is no null class
      9. § 74. The class as one, except when it has one term, is distinct from the class as many
      10. § 75. Every, any, a and some each denote one object, but an ambiguous one
      11. § 76. The relation of a term to its class
      12. § 77. The relation of inclusion between classes
      13. § 78. The contradiction
      14. § 79. Summary

    7. Chapter VII. Propositional Functions.

      1. § 80. Indefinability of such that
      2. § 81. Where a fixed relation to a fixed term is asserted, a propositional function can be analysed into a variable subject and a constant assertion
      3. § 82. But this analysis is impossible in other cases
      4. § 83. Variation of the concept in a proposition
      5. § 84. Relation of propositional functions to classes
      6. § 85. A propositional function is in general not analysable into a constant and a variable element

    8. Chapter VIII. The Variable.

      1. § 86. Nature of the variable
      2. § 87. Relation of the variable to any
      3. § 88. Formal and restricted variables
      4. § 89. Formal implication presupposes any
      5. § 90. Duality of any and some
      6. § 91. The class-concept propositional function is indefinable
      7. § 92. Other classes can be defined by means of such that
      8. § 93. Analysis of the variable

    9. Chapter IX. Relations

      1. § 94. Characteristics of relations
      2. § 95. Relations of terms to themselves
      3. § 96. The domain and the converse domain of a relation
      4. § 97. Logical sum, logical product and relative product of relations
      5. § 98. A relation is not a class of couples
      6. § 99. Relations of a relation to its terms

    10. Chapter X. The Contradiction

      1. § 100. Consequences of the contradiction
      2. § 101. Various statements of the contradiction
      3. § 102. An analogous generalized argument
      4. § 103. Various statements of the contradiction
      5. § 104. The contradiction arises from treating as one a class which is only many
      6. § 105. Other primâ facie possible solutions appear inadequate
      7. § 106. Summary of Part I

  3. Part II. Number

    1. Chapter XI. Definition of Cardinal Numbers

      1. § 107. Plan of Part II
      2. § 108. Mathematical meaning of definition
      3. § 109. Definitions of numbers by abstraction
      4. § 110. Objections to this definition
      5. § 111. Nominal definition of numbers

    2. Chapter XII. Addition and Multiplication

      1. § 112. Only integers to be considered at present
      2. § 113. Definition of arithmetical addition
      3. § 114. Dependence upon the logical addition of classes
      4. § 115. Definition of multiplication
      5. § 116. Connection of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation

    3. Chapter XIII. Finite and Infinite

      1. § 117. Definition of finite and infinite
      2. § 118. Definition of a0
      3. § 119. Definition of finite numbers by mathematical induction

    4. Chapter XIV. Theory of Finite Numbers

      1. § 120. Peano's indefinables and primitive propositions
      2. § 121. Mutual independence of the latter
      3. § 122. Peano really defines progressions, not finite numbers
      4. § 123. Proof of Peano's primitive propositions

    5. Chapter XV. Addition of Terms and Addition of Classes

      1. § 124. Philosophy and mathematics distinguished
      2. § 125. Is there a more fundamental sense of number than that defined above?
      3. § 126. Numbers must be classes
      4. § 127. Numbers apply to classes as many
      5. § 128. One is to be asserted, not of terms, but of unit classes
      6. § 129. Counting not fundamental in arithmetic
      7. § 130. Numerical conjunction and plurality
      8. § 131. Addition of terms generates classes primarily, not numbers
      9. § 132. A term is indefinable, but not the number 1

    6. Chapter XVI. Whole and Part

      1. § 133. Single terms may be either simple or complex
      2. § 134. Whole and part cannot be defined by logical priority
      3. § 135. Three kinds of relation of whole and part distinguished
      4. § 136. Two kinds of wholes distinguished
      5. § 137. A whole is distinct from the numerical conjunctions of its parts
      6. § 138. How far analysis is falsification
      7. § 139. A class as one is an aggregate

    7. Chapter XVII. Infinite Wholes

      1. § 140. Infinite aggregates must be admitted
      2. § 141. Infinite unities, if there are any, are unknown to us
      3. § 142. Are all infinite wholes aggregates of terms?
      4. § 143. Grounds in favour of this view

    8. Chapter XVIII. Ratios and Fractions

      1. § 144. Definition of ratio
      2. § 145. Ratios are one-one relations
      3. § 146. Fractions are concerned with relations of whole and part
      4. § 147. Fractions depend, not upon number, but upon magnitude of divisibility
      5. § 148. Summary of Part II

  4. Part III. Quantity

    1. Chapter XIX. The Meaning of Magnitude

      1. § 149. Previous views on the relation of number and quantity
      2. § 150. Quantity not fundamental in mathematics
      3. § 151. Meaning of magnitude and quantity
      4. § 152. Three possible theories of equality to be examined
      5. § 153. Equality is not identity of number of parts
      6. § 154. Equality is not an unanalyzable relation of quantities
      7. § 155. Equality is sameness of magnitude
      8. § 156. Every particular magnitude is simple
      9. § 157. The principle of abstraction
      10. § 158. Summary
      11. Note to Chapter XIX.

    2. Chapter XX. The Range of Quantity

      1. § 159. Divisibility does not belong to all quantities
      2. § 160. Distance
      3. § 161. Differential coefficients
      4. § 162. A magnitude is never divisible, but may be a magnitude of divisibility
      5. § 163. Every magnitude is unanalyzable

    3. Chapter XXI. Numbers as Expressing Magnitudes: Measurement

      1. § 164. Definition of measurement
      2. § 165. Possible grounds for holding all magnitudes to be measurable
      3. § 166. Intrinsic measurability
      4. § 167. Of divisibilities
      5. § 168. And of distances
      6. § 169. Measure of distance and measure of stretch
      7. § 170. Distance-theories and stretch-theories of geometry
      8. § 171. Extensive and intensive magnitudes

    4. Chapter XXII. Zero

      1. § 172. Difficulties as to zero
      2. § 173. Meinong's theory
      3. § 174. Zero as minimum
      4. § 175. Zero distance as identity
      5. § 176. Zero as a null segment
      6. § 177. Zero and negation
      7. § 178. Every kind of zero magnitude is in a sense indefinable

    5. Chapter XXIII. Infinity, the Infinitesimal, and Continuity

      1. § 179. Problems of infinity not specially quantitative
      2. § 180. Statement of the problem in regard to quantity
      3. § 181. Three antinomies
      4. § 182. Of which the antitheses depend upon an axiom of finitude
      5. § 183. And the use of mathematical induction
      6. § 184. Which are both to be rejected
      7. § 185. Provisional sense of continuity
      8. § 186. Summary of Part III

  5. Part IV. Order

    1. Chapter XXIV. The Genesis of Series

      1. § 187. Importance of order
      2. § 188. Between and separation of couples
      3. § 189. Generation of order by one-one relations
      4. § 190. By transitive asymmetrical relations
      5. § 191. By distances
      6. § 192. By triangular relations
      7. § 193. By relations between asymmetrical relations
      8. § 194. And by separation of couples

    2. Chapter XXV. The Meaning of Order

      1. § 195. What is order?
      2. § 196. Three theories of between
      3. § 197. First theory
      4. § 198. A relation is not between its terms
      5. § 199. Second theory of between
      6. § 200. There appear to be ultimate triangular relations
      7. § 201. Reasons for rejecting the second theory
      8. § 202. Third theory of between to be rejected
      9. § 203. Meaning of separation of couples
      10. § 204. Reduction to transitive asymmetrical relations
      11. § 205. This reduction is formal
      12. § 206. But is the reason why separation leads to order
      13. § 207. The second way of generating series is alone fundamental, and gives the meaning of order

    3. Chapter XXVI. Asymmetrical Relations

      1. § 208. Classification of relations as regards symmetry and transitiveness
      2. § 209. Symmetrical transitive relations
      3. § 210. Reflexiveness and the principle of abstraction
      4. § 211. Relative position
      5. § 212. Are relations reducible to predications?
      6. § 213. Monadistic theory of relations
      7. § 214. Reasons for rejecting the theory
      8. § 215. Monistic theory and the reasons for rejecting it
      9. § 216. Order requires that relations should be ultimate

    4. Chapter XXVII. Difference of Sense and Difference of Sign

      1. § 217. Kant on difference of sense
      2. § 218. Meaning of difference of sense
      3. § 219. Difference of sign
      4. § 220. In the cases of finite numbers
      5. § 221. And of magnitudes
      6. § 222. Right and left
      7. § 223. Difference of sign arises from difference of sense among transitive asymmetrical relations

    5. Chapter XXVIII. On the Difference Between Open and Closed Series

      1. § 224. What is the difference between open and closed series?
      2. § 225. Finite closed series
      3. § 226. Series generated by triangular relations
      4. § 227. Four-term relations
      5. § 228. Closed series are such as have an arbitrary first term

    6. Chapter XXIX. Progressions and Ordinal Numbers

      1. § 229. Definition of progressions
      2. § 230. All finite arithmetic applies to every progression
      3. § 231. Definition of ordinal numbers
      4. § 232. Definition of nth
      5. § 233. Positive and negative ordinals

    7. Chapter XXX. Dedekind's Theory of Number

      1. § 234. Dedekind's principal ideas
      2. § 235. Representation of a system
      3. § 236. The notion of a chain
      4. § 237. The chain of an element
      5. § 238. Generalized form of mathematical induction
      6. § 239. Definition of a singly infinite system
      7. § 240. Definition of cardinals
      8. § 241. Dedekind's proof of mathematical induction
      9. § 242. Objections to his definition of ordinals
      10. § 243. And of cardinals

    8. Chapter XXXI. Distance

      1. § 244. Distance not essential to order
      2. § 245. Definition of distance
      3. § 246. Measurement of distances
      4. § 247. In most series, the existence of distances is doubtful
      5. § 248. Summary of Part IV

  6. Part V. Infinity and Continuity

    1. Chapter XXXII. The Correlation of Series

      1. § 249. The infinitesimal and space are no longer required in a statement of principles
      2. § 250. The supposed contradictions of infinity have been resolved
      3. § 251. Correlation of series
      4. § 252. Independent series and series by correlation
      5. § 253. Likeness of relations
      6. § 254. Functions
      7. § 255. Functions of a variable whose values form a series
      8. § 256. Functions which are defined by formulae
      9. § 257. Complete series

    2. Chapter XXXIII. Real Numbers

      1. § 258. Real numbers are not limits of series of rationals
      2. § 259. Segments of rationals
      3. § 260. Properties of segments
      4. § 261. Coherent classes in a series

    3. Chapter XXXIV. Limits and Irrational Numbers

      1. § 262. Definition of a limit
      2. § 263. Elementary properties of limits
      3. § 264. An arithmetical theory of irrationals is indispensable
      4. § 265. Dedekind's theory of irrationals
      5. § 266. Defects in Dedekind's axiom of continuity
      6. § 267. Objections to his theory of irrationals
      7. § 268. Weierstrass's theory
      8. § 269. Cantor's theory
      9. § 270. Real numbers are segments of rationals

    4. Chapter XXXV. Cantor's First Definition of Continuity

      1. § 271. The arithmetical theory of continuity is due to Cantor
      2. § 272. Cohesion
      3. § 273. Perfection
      4. § 274. Defect in Cantor's definition of perfection
      5. § 275. The existence of limits must not be assumed without special grounds

    5. Chapter XXXVI. Ordinal Continuity

      1. § 276. Continuity is a purely ordinal notion
      2. § 277. Cantor's ordinal definition of continuity
      3. § 278. Only ordinal notions occur in this definition
      4. § 279. Infinite classes of integers can be arranged in a continuous series
      5. § 280. Segments of general compact series
      6. § 281. Segments defined by fundamental series
      7. § 282. Two compact series may be combined to form a series which is not compact

    6. Chapter XXXVII. Transfinite Cardinals

      1. § 283. Transfinite cardinals differ widely from transfinite ordinals
      2. § 284. Definition of cardinals
      3. § 285. Properties of cardinals
      4. § 286. Addition, multiplication, and exponentiation
      5. § 287. The smallest transfinite cardinal a0
      6. § 288. Other transfinite cardinals
      7. § 289. Finite and transfinite cardinals form a single series by relation to greater and less

    7. Chapter XXXVIII. Transfinite Ordinals

      1. § 290. Ordinals are classes of serial relations
      2. § 291. Cantor's definition of the second class of ordinals
      3. § 292. Definition of ω
      4. § 293. An infinite class can be arranged in many types of series
      5. § 294. Addition and subtraction of ordinals
      6. § 295. Multiplication and division
      7. § 296. Well-ordered series
      8. § 297. Series which are not well-ordered
      9. § 298. Ordinal numbers are types of well-ordered series
      10. § 299. Relation-arithmetic
      11. § 300. Proofs of existence-theorems
      12. § 301. There is no maximum ordinal number
      13. § 302. Successive derivatives of a series

    8. Chapter XXXIX. The Infinitesimal Calculus

      1. § 303. The infinitesimal has been usually supposed essential to the calculus
      2. § 304. Definition of a continuous function
      3. § 305. Definition of the derivative of a function
      4. § 306. The infinitesimal is not implied in this definition
      5. § 307. Definition of the definite integral
      6. § 308. Neither the infinite nor the infinitesimal is involved in this definition

    9. Chapter XL. The Infinitesimal and the Improper Infinite

      1. § 309. A precise definition of the infinitesimal is seldom given
      2. § 310. Definition of the infinitesimal and the improper infinite
      3. § 311. Instances of the infinitesimal
      4. § 312. No infinitesimal segments in compact series
      5. § 313. Orders of infinity and infinitesimality
      6. § 314. Summary

    10. Chapter XLI. Philosophical Arguments Concerning the Infinitesimal

      1. § 315. Current philosophical opinions illustrated by Cohen
      2. § 316. Who bases the calculus upon infinitesimals
      3. § 317. Space and motion are here irrelevant
      4. § 318. Cohen regards the doctrine of limits as insufficient for the calculus
      5. § 319. And supposes limits to be essentially quantitative
      6. § 320. To involve infinitesimal differences
      7. § 321. And to introduce a new meaning of equality
      8. § 322. He identifies the inextensive with the intensive
      9. § 323. Consecutive numbers are supposed to be required for continuous change
      10. § 324. Cohen's views are to be rejected

    11. Chapter XLII. The Philosophy of the Continuum

      1. § 325. Philosophical sense of continuity not here in question
      2. § 326. The continuum is composed of mutually external units
      3. § 327. Zeno and Weierstrass
      4. § 328. The argument of dichotomy
      5. § 329. The objectionable and the innocent kind of endless regress
      6. § 330. Extensional and intensional definition of a whole
      7. § 331. Achilles and the tortoise
      8. § 332. The arrow
      9. § 333. Change does not involve a state of change
      10. § 334. The argument of the measure
      11. § 335. Summary of Cantor's doctrine of continuity
      12. § 336. The continuum consists of elements

    12. Chapter XLIII. The Philosophy of the Infinite

      1. § 337. Historical retrospect
      2. § 338. Positive doctrine of the infinite
      3. § 339. Proof that there are infinite classes
      4. § 340. The paradox of Tristram Shandy
      5. § 341. A whole and a part may be similar
      6. § 342. Whole and part and formal implication
      7. § 343. No immediate predecessor of ω or a0
      8. § 344. Difficulty as regards the number of all terms, objects, or propositions
      9. § 345. Cantor's first proof that there is no greatest number
      10. § 346. His second proof
      11. § 347. Every class has more sub-classes than terms
      12. § 348. But this is impossible in certain cases
      13. § 349. Resulting contradictions
      14. § 350. Summary of Part V

  7. Part VI. Space

    1. Chapter XLIV. Dimensions and Complex Numbers

      1. § 351. Retrospect
      2. § 352. Geometry is the science of series of two or more dimensions
      3. § 353. Non-Euclidean geometry
      4. § 354. Definition of dimensions
      5. § 355. Remarks on the definition
      6. § 356. The definition of dimensions is purely logical
      7. § 357. Complex numbers and universal algebra
      8. § 358. Algebraical generalization of number
      9. § 359. Definition of complex numbers
      10. § 360. Remarks on the definition

    2. Chapter XLV. Projective Geometry

      1. § 361. Recent threefold scrutiny of geometrical principles
      2. § 362. Projective, descriptive, and metrical geometry
      3. § 363. Projective points and straight lines
      4. § 364. Definition of the plane
      5. § 365. Harmonic ranges
      6. § 366. Involutions
      7. § 367. Projective generation of order
      8. § 368. Möbius nets
      9. § 369. Projective order presupposed in assigning irrational coordinates
      10. § 370. Anharmonic ratio
      11. § 371. Assignment of coordinates to any point in space
      12. § 372. Comparison of projective and Euclidean geometry
      13. § 373. The principle of duality

    3. Chapter XLVI. Descriptive Geometry

      1. § 374. Distinction between projective and descriptive geometry
      2. § 375. Method of Pasch and Peano
      3. § 376. Method employing serial relations
      4. § 377. Mutual independence of axioms
      5. § 378. Logical definition of the class of descriptive spaces
      6. § 379. Parts of straight lines
      7. § 380. Definition of the plane
      8. § 381. Solid geometry
      9. § 382. Descriptive geometry applies to Euclidean and hyperbolic, but not elliptic space
      10. § 383. Ideal elements
      11. § 384. Ideal points
      12. § 385. Ideal lines
      13. § 386. Ideal planes
      14. § 387. The removal of a suitable selection of points renders a projective space descriptive

    4. Chapter XLVII. Metrical Geometry

      1. § 388. Metrical geometry presupposes projective or descriptive geometry
      2. § 389. Errors in Euclid
      3. § 390. Superposition is not a valid method
      4. § 391. Errors in Euclid (continued)
      5. § 392. Axioms of distance
      6. § 393. Stretches
      7. § 394. Order as resulting from distance alone
      8. § 395. Geometries which derive the straight line from distance
      9. § 396. In most spaces, magnitude of divisibility can be used instead of distance
      10. § 397. Meaning of magnitude of divisibility
      11. § 398. Difficulty of making distance independent of stretch
      12. § 399. Theoretical meaning of measurement
      13. § 400. Definition of angle
      14. § 401. Axioms concerning angles
      15. § 402. An angle is a stretch of rays, not a class of points
      16. § 403. Areas and volumes
      17. § 404. Right and left

    5. Chapter XLVIII. Relation of Metrical to Projective and Descriptive Geometry

      1. § 405. Non-quantitative geometry has no metrical presuppositions
      2. § 406. Historical development of non-quantitative geometry
      3. § 407. Non-quantitative theory of distance
      4. § 408. In descriptive geometry
      5. § 409. And in projective geometry
      6. § 410. Geometrical theory of imaginary point-pairs
      7. § 411. New projective theory of distance

    6. Chapter XLIX. Definitions of Various Spaces

      1. § 412. All kinds of spaces are definable in purely logical terms
      2. § 413. Definition of projective spaces of three dimensions
      3. § 414. Definition of Euclidean spaces of three dimensions
      4. § 415. Definition of Clifford's spaces of two dimensions

    7. Chapter L. The Continuity of Space

      1. § 416. The continuity of a projective space
      2. § 417. The continuity of metrical space
      3. § 418. An axiom of continuity enables us to dispense with the postulate of the circle
      4. § 419. Is space prior to points?
      5. § 420. Empirical premisses and induction
      6. § 421. There is no reason to desire our premisses to be self-evident
      7. § 422. Space is an aggregate of points, not a unity

    8. Chapter LI. Logical Arguments Against Points

      1. § 423. Absolute and relative position
      2. § 424. Lotze's arguments against absolute position
      3. § 425. Lotze's theory of relations
      4. § 426. The subject-predicate theory of propositions
      5. § 427. Lotze's three kinds of Being
      6. § 428. Argument from the identity of indiscernibles
      7. § 429. Points are not active
      8. § 430. Argument from the necessary truths of geometry
      9. § 431. Points do not imply one another

    9. Chapter LII. Kant's Theory of Space

      1. § 432. The present work is diametrically opposed to Kant
      2. § 433. Summary of Kant's theory
      3. § 434. Mathematical reasoning requires no extra-logical element
      4. § 435. Kant's mathematical antinomies
      5. § 436. Summary of Part VI

  8. Part VII. Matter and Motion

    1. Chapter LIII. Matter

      1. § 437. Dynamics is here considered as a branch of pure mathematics.
      2. § 438. Matter is not implied by space
      3. § 439. Matter as substance
      4. § 440. Relations of matter to space and time
      5. § 441. Definition of matter in terms of logical constants

    2. Chapter LIV. Motion

      1. § 442. Definition of change
      2. § 443. There is no such thing as a state of change
      3. § 444. Change involves existence
      4. § 445. Occupation of a place at a time
      5. § 446. Definition of motion
      6. § 447. There is no state of motion

    3. Chapter LV. Causality

      1. § 448. The descriptive theory of dynamics
      2. § 449. Causation of particulars by particulars
      3. § 450. Cause and effect are not temporally contiguous
      4. § 451. Is there any causation of particulars by particulars?
      5. § 452. Generalized form of causality

    4. Chapter LVI. Definition of a Dynamic World

      1. § 453. Kinematical motions
      2. § 454. Kinetic motions

    5. Chapter LVII. Newton's Laws of Motion

      1. § 455. Force and acceleration are fictions
      2. § 456. The law of inertia
      3. § 457. The second law of motion
      4. § 458. The third law
      5. § 459. Summary of Newtonian principles
      6. § 460. Causality in dynamics
      7. § 461. Accelerations as caused by particulars
      8. § 462. No part of the laws of motion is an à priori truth

    6. Chapter LVIII. Absolute and Relative Motion

      1. § 463. Newton and his critics
      2. § 464. Grounds for absolute motion
      3. § 465. Neumann's theory
      4. § 466. Streintz's theory
      5. § 467. Mr Macaulay's theory
      6. § 468. Absolute rotation is still a change of relation
      7. § 469. Mach's reply to Newton

    7. Chapter LIX. Hertz's Dynamics

      1. § 470. Summary of Hertz's system
      2. § 471. Hertz's innovations are not fundamental from the point of view of pure mathematics
      3. § 472. Principles common to Hertz and Newton
      4. § 473. Principle of the equality of cause and effect
      5. § 474. Summary of the work

  9. Part Appendices. 

    1. Appendix A. The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege

      1. § 475. Principal points in Frege's doctrines
      2. § 476. Meaning and indication
      3. § 477. Truth-values and judgment
      4. § 478. Criticism
      5. § 479. Are assumptions proper names for the true or the false?
      6. § 480. Functions
      7. § 481. Begriff and Gegenstand
      8. § 482. Recapitulation of theory of propositional functions
      9. § 483. Can concepts be made logical subjects?
      10. § 484. Ranges
      11. § 485. Definition of ∈ and of relation
      12. § 486. Reasons for an extensional view of classes
      13. § 487. A class which has only one member is distinct from its only member
      14. § 488. Possible theories to account for this fact
      15. § 489. Recapitulation of theories already discussed
      16. § 490. The subject of a proposition may be plural
      17. § 491. Classes having only one member
      18. § 492. Theory of types
      19. § 493. Implication and symbolic logic
      20. § 494. Definition of cardinal numbers
      21. § 495. Frege's theory of series
      22. § 496. Kerry's criticisms of Frege

    2. Appendix B. The Doctrine of Types

      1. § 497. Statement of the doctrine
      2. § 498. Numbers and propositions as types
      3. § 499. Are propositional concepts individuals?
      4. § 500. Contradiction arising from the question whether there are more classes of propositions than propositions
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